The Semiotics of Global Warming: Combating Semiotic Corrruption by Gare, Arran
The Semiotics of Global Warming: Combating Semiotic Corruption file:///C:/DATA/all/PAPERS/Gare.html
1 of 32 7/06/2007 12:28 PM
Theory & Science (2007)
ISSN: 1527-5558
The Semiotics of Global Warming: Combating
Semiotic Corruption
Arran Gare
Swinburne University of Technology 
agare@groupwise.swin.edu.au 
Abstract
The central focus of this paper is the disjunction between the findings of climate science in revealing the
threat of global warming and the failure to act appropriately to these warnings. The development of climate
science can be illuminated through the perspective provided by Peircian semiotics, but efforts to account for
its success as a science and its failure to convince people to act accordingly indicate the need to supplement
Peirce’s ideas. The more significant gaps, it is argued, call for the integration of major new ideas. It will be
argued that Peirce should be viewed as a Schellingian philosopher, and it will then be shown how this
facilitates integration into his philosophy of concepts developed by other philosophers and theorists within
this tradition. In particular, Bourdieu’s concepts of the ‘habitus’ and ‘field’ will be integrated with Peirce’s
semiotics and used to analyse the achievements and failures of climate science. It will be suggested that the
resulting synthesis can augment Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology and so provide a better basis for
comprehending and responding to the situation within which we find ourselves.
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Introduction: The On-Going Debate About Global Warming
There is something paradoxical about the present relationship between humanity and the rest of nature.
Scientists have been able to interpret a vast array of signs to reveal humanity’s impact on the global
ecosystem. They have shown that if humanity continues on its present path, the consequences are likely to
be disastrous, both for humanity and most other life forms on Earth. However, the measures being taken to
address the problem are so paltry that unless something dramatic happens, these measures will delay, only
very slightly, the coming catastrophe. What is the relevance of semiotics to this situation?
The discovery of global warming can be characterized as a triumph of human semiosis, revealing the threat 
to the global environment of continued increases in greenhouse gas emissions and the scale of action needed
to prevent global ecological degradation. Al Gore in his film and accompanying book An Inconvenient 
Truth,
a major work disseminating the conclusions reached by scientists, characterized some of this work of 
interpretation:
Lonnie and his team of experts … examine the tiny bubbles of air trapped in the snow in the
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year that it fell. They can measure how much CO 2 was in the Earth’s atmosphere in the past,
year by year. They can also measure the exact temperature of the atmosphere each year by
calculating the ratio of different isotopes of oxygen (oxygen-16 and oxygen-18), which
provides an ingenious and highly accurate thermometer (2006: 63).
Combining work on such interpretations with computer modeling of weather, climate scientists are now able
to project with some confidence what will happen in the future as greenhouse gases increase. All such work 
has been interpreted and assessed by a working group of several thousand scientists from around the world 
forming the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). This was established in 1988 and it made 
its first report in 1990. Their very tentative findings were disputed by some scientists, but work continued. 
In January of 2007 they produced their fourth report, Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis, 
revealing something like a worldwide scientific consensus that there is at least a 90% probability that 
humans are bringing about a major increase in global temperature. 
The findings of this report have not only been published in several languages and reported in newspapers 
around the world, they are available for downloading through the internet. While there are still diehard 
skeptics, the consensus reached among climate scientists, personal experience, newspaper reports from 
elsewhere in the world of unusual weather, together with an increasing number of publications on global 
warming, appear to be reducing their influence on the general public. Even economists are taking global 
warming seriously. In September of 2006 the influential journal The Economist devoted a special edition to 
climate change. It reported that while one economist, Robert Mendelsohn, has predicted that a 2.5 °C
increase in temperature would result in a fall in global output of 0.1% a year, another environmental 
economist, William Nordhouse, predicts a fall of 3% of global output, and a reduction of American GDP of 
0.5%. In Britain the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change submitted in October, 2006 and now 
published argued that a failure to act would lead to a fall in global GDP of at least 5% and could rise to 20% 
(Stern 2007: vi). Sir Nicholas Stern now believes that because of the reduced capacity of oceans and forests 
to absorb greenhouse gases, the situation is worse than he thought it was.
Stern’s growing pessimism is in line with criticisms of this consensus, much more plausible than those of the
skeptics, which has come from other scientists. For instance, a study published by the National Academy of
Sciences in May, 2007 has shown that CO 2 emissions are increasing at an accelerating rate. The rate of
increase has trebled from 1.1% per year in the 1990s to 3.3% per year between 2000 and 2004. This is worse
than the worst case scenario of the IPCC report (Raupach 2007). Each IPCC so far has been more
pessimistic than the previous one, and it is likely that the next report will be more pessimistic again. What
had been previously judged to be the worst case scenarios are the ones being realized. The major problem is
taking into account all the positive feedback loops triggered by further warming. James Lovelock (2006),
author of the Gaia hypothesis: the thesis that the global ecosystem functions to maintain the conditions for
life on Earth, argues that over the next one hundred years it is likely there will be a massive collapse of life,
with only several hundred million people living near the North Pole surviving in a vastly degraded
environment that will take more than 200,000 years to recuperate, because even before global warming
humans had inflicted so much damage on their environment.
While some countries have been seriously concerned to reduce greenhouse gases, the overall trend is for 
them to increase. Despite widespread publicity in support of greener sources of energy, no region of the 
world reduced the amount of carbon used to produce energy between 2000 and 2004 (Raupauch 2007). The 
governments of countries such as Australia, Canada, China and USA (with the exception of California) have
resisted efforts to reduce their emissions and appear to be bent on increasing them. Governments appear to 
have concluded that if they produce reports and make statements indicating the severity of the problem, then
they can avoid acting. Even the most responsible societies are not achieving the reductions that are required 
to put a stop to global warming. Norway in 1990 set a target of reduced greenhouse gas emissions; by 2010 
their emissions will be 150% of their 1990 level. Europeans have had difficulty setting a target of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions by 20% with Sweden and Denmark calling for a target of 30%. But the Hadley 
Centre for Climate Change in 2005 claimed that it would require a 70% reduction in emissions to stabilize 
existing greenhouse gas concentrations (Hadley Centre: 62). The Stern report recommended stabilizing CO 
2e at or below 550ppm (which will still involve significant risks of a catastrophe), requiring the power 
industry to be at least 60% decarbonised by 2050 (Stern 2006: xi) . The report noted that emissions will have 
to be reduced by 80% to stabilize temperatures, whatever the level (xi). George Mondbiot argued that it will 
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be necessary to cut carbon emissions by 90% by 2030 to ensure tha t we do not go over the tipping point, 
deemed by the German Advisory Council on Global Change to be an increased temperature of 2 ºC, where a
runaway greenhouse effect will be unstoppable (2006: 17).
A Peircian Perspective on Global Warming
This description of the discovery of global warming provides prima facie justification for attempting to
interpret this whole development in terms of semiotics as Peirce conceived it. Science can be construed as a
semiotic process of interpreting, producing and reinterpreting signs. It involves hypothesizing to explain
unexpected indexes of change, elaborating these hypotheses into models (icons) of these changes to deduce
what can be expected in the future, and carrying out investigations to test such changed expectations, then
using rhetoric to change the beliefs of others. Here, signs of climate change have generated a long quest by a
community of diverse scientists to explain this unexpected phenomenon, hypothesizing a relation between
global warming and greenhouse gas emissions, constructing charts and then computer models of this
relationship, examining and measuring every sign in nature which could illuminate this hypothesis or test
these models, and by considering every argument, gradually moving towards a consensus. It has also
generated a concerted effort to convince people that they need to take action and live differently. Can such a
semiotic interpretation of our knowledge of global warming and the relationship between this knowledge
and people’s actions be carried through in detail? And what is achieved by doing this?
Let us look at the second question first. What is the point of attempting to interpret the quest to understand 
global warming through Peircian semiotics? The main impetus for examining more closely this quest is that 
there appears to be something radically wrong - an immense problem seems to have been identified by a 
respectable branch of the scientific community in a way which seems eminently comprehensible as a 
semiotic process, but contrary to what one should expect from pragmaticist semiotics, humanity is failing to 
grapple with this problem. Peircian semiotics, because of the breadth of perspective it offers, should be able 
to bring into focus all facets of this problem. Through semiotics we can examine scientific research, the 
relationships between different branches of science, between science and public beliefs, government 
policies, decision-making and ensuing action, and also the relationships between different societies around 
the world and the relationship between humanity and the rest of nature. Semiotics can provide an 
interpretation of the situation of humanity necessary for humans to comprehend not only their dire situation 
but their potential to change accordingly. As Max Oelschlaeger (2001) argued, it is only when we develop a 
conception of ourselves as a language animal that we are in a position to recognize our potential to 
transform ecologically maladaptive cultural forms, and this conception of ourselves drives home the truth 
that, whatever illusions dominate us, cultural processes of selection are ultimately subject to natural 
selection. Most importantly, Peircian semiotics provides a programme of research to identify where the 
breakdown is between interpretation and effective action.
Answering the first question, can this semiotic interpretation of the study of global warming be carried
through to a conclusion, is problematic in more ways than one. It is clearly a question that should be
embraced by proponents of Peircian semiotics as a test of their research programme. But as soon as we
attempt to become more precise in our characterization of the study of global warming through semiotics
there is the problem of how to interpret the sometimes enigmatic writings and inconsistent terminology of
Peirce, to choose between the different formulations by Peirce of crucial ideas or to choose between the vast
number of divergent interpretations of his work. This is particularly evident when we look at the divergent
interpretations offered by people from different traditions of thought: pragmatists, analytic philosophers,
logicians, semioticians, philosophers of science, natural philosophers and metaphysicians. Rather than enter
all these debates, I will consider Peirce mainly as contributing to a tradition of philosophy of science and to
metaphysics. I believe and will assume (following Joseph Esposito) that Peirce’s claim to be a ‘Schellingian
of some stripe’ (CP: 6.605), and his characterization of his philosophy as ‘Schellingism transformed in the
light of modern physics’ (Peirce, 1992: 97), should be taken seriously and that his work can best be
understood as developing the tradition of natural philosophy deriving from Friedrich von Schelling
(Esposito, 1977a: 202f.; Esposito, 1977b; Esposito, 1980). Generally, this means using the later and more
radical of Peirce’s formulations of his philosophy (Esposito 1980: 173ff.; Short 2004: 230ff.), and because
of the difficulty Peirce complained about of presenting his more radical views, looking for the esoteric
content of what he did write. Most importantly, this means interpreting Peirce’s analyses of semiosis as
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applying to the whole of nature. It is in relation to the Schellingian tradition, I believe, that the
achievements, limitations and also importance of Peirce’s work in relation to our current situation can be
best understood.
Peirce and Schelling
What is involved in seeing Peirce as belonging to the Schellingian tradition of natural philosophy? It is to
situate it in relation to and as fundamentally opposed to the mechanistic world view as this developed from
Hobbes, Descartes and Newton according to which, as Piece put it,  ‘the laws of mechanics determine
everything that happens according to immutable attractions and repulsion’ and that the ‘instantaneous state
of things from which every other state of things is calculable consists in the positions and velocities of all
the particles at any instant’ (EP I: 300), while at the same time reacting to the deficiencies in the Idealist
reaction against this which privileged consciousness and treated nature as derivative from mind, either
individual (in the case of Berkeley and Kant) or collective (in the case of Fichte and Hegel). Most
importantly, the Schellingian tradition is committed to doing full justice to both mathematical physics and
free human agency while overcoming Cartesian dualism. In this regard it needs to be seen in relation to
Kant’s argument that the free, unified self-conscious transcendental ego (the unified ‘I think’ which
accompanies all perceptions) is a condition for achieving knowledge of the world and the development of
this argument by his followers. Fichte argued that only through mutual recognition between people, whose
thought emerges first in relation to action in a world which resists their will, could such self-consciousness
be achieved, an argument accepted by Schelling and greatly developed by Hegel. However, Schelling
(following H ölderlin) concluded that it is also necessary to conceive the ego as part of and within nature to
make intelligible the possibility of self-consciousness. To show that consciousness as conceived by Fichte
and Hegel could have emerged within nature it was necessary to reject Kant’s solution to the incompatibility
of the mechanical view of the world and the assumption of free agency, that is, holding that the mechanical
world is mere appearance, the outcome of the organization of the sensory manifold by the productive
imagination, the forms of intuition (space and time) and the categories of the understanding. Instead,
Schelling argued that our comprehension of human consciousness has to be based on the philosophy of
nature (Beiser, 2002: 478), replacing the mechanistic conception of the physical world with a conception of
nature as dynamic and creative within which humans as social, self-conscious, creative beings, could have
evolved.
While Schelling drew on many sources to develop his philosophy of nature (most immediately, Herder and 
Goethe), one of the most important was Anaximander, the original proponent of an evolutionary cosmology.
Anaximander had argued that the cosmos emerges and develops through the limiting of the unlimited 
(Seligman, 1962: 121ff.). The influence of this on Schelling is evident in his proclamation: 
Nature philosophy arrives at this explanation simply by virtue of the presupposition that for
Nature the permanent is a limitation of its own activity. … For the philosopher, the points of
inhibition will be signified by products; every product of this kind will represent a determinate
sphere which Nature always fills anew, and into which the stream of its force incessantly gushes
(Schelling 2004: 17f.).
To oppose Hegel’s idealism, Schelling later went on to argue that there is an unprethinkable being
(unvordenkliches Sein) which cannot be doubted, the appreciation of which precedes all  thought, including
scientific and philosophical thought (Snow, 1996: 145ff.) We are in and part of the world we are striving to
comprehend, the product of a whole series of nature’s limiting itself and our own self-limiting, and our
efforts to comprehend the world are developments within nature. Schelling characterized his own
philosophy as “neither materialism nor spiritualism, neither realism nor idealism”; but as containing within
itself “the opposition of all earlier systems” (Schelling, 1994: 120). However Peirce characterized his own
philosophy (Peirce characterized it as ‘objective idealism’ and ‘scholastic realism’), and however others
have characterized Peirce’s philosophy, this, I believe, is the best description of it. Peirce, in aligning
himself with Schelling, was a post-Cartesian, post-Newtonian, post-Kantian, post-Hegelian philosopher
grappling with the problems defined by Schelling’s project of overcoming the opposition of all earlier
systems. In the quest to transcend these oppositions Schelling inspired a tradition of philosophy which
includes Henri Bergson, Aleksandr Bogdanov, Alfred North Whitehead and Ludwig von Bertalanffy,
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although not all these have been directly influenced by his work.  It is in this sense that I believe Peirce
should be seen as a Schellingian philosopher, and it is as such that Peirce’s ideas will be considered.
Peirce as a Schellingian Natural Philosopher
The key to Peirce’s effort to advance Schellingian ideas was his reconception of perception and thought as
the production and interpretation of signs, and his reconception of nature to give a central place to signs and
their interpretation. Accordingly, he argued that we are free, purposeful agents capable of logical thought
having evolved within nature characterized as ‘actual reactive existence’, which in turn has emerged from
‘germinal being’ or ‘esse in potentia’ (EP II: 180). Germinal being, which Peirce elsewhere characterized as
‘a chaos of unpersonalized feeling’ (EP I: 297), being without relations, was categorized as monadic, and
therefore as belonging to the category of ‘Firstness’. This is equivalent to Schelling’s ‘unprethinkable
being’, or equivalently, Anaximander’s ‘unlimited’. ‘Actual reactive existence’ is the result of nature,
through chance, taking on habits, limiting its possibilities and thereby making nature predictable. As
habituated, nature consists of ‘Brute reactions’ or ‘Objects’ or ‘Existents’ that resist our actions. Such
resistance implies a dyadic relation, and was characterized by Peirce as belonging to the category of
‘Secondness’. With dyadic relations we have the conditions for triadic relations, that is, that which belongs
to the category of ‘Thirdness’, and with triadic relations we have the possibility of semiosis – the production
and interpretation of signs. In 1907 Peirce offered his most general definition of a sign as that which
‘mediates between an object and an interpretant; since it is both determined by the object relatively to the 
interpretant, and determines the interpretant in reference to the object, in such wise as to cause the
interpretant to be determined by the object through the mediation of the “sign”’ (EP II: 410). It is important
to emphasize here ‘this tri-relative influence’ is not ‘in any way resolvable into actions between pairs’
(Peirce, 1955: 282). Such semiosis involves further limiting of possibilities or determining, in this case of
the interpretant by the object through the sign. While the ‘interpretant’ was understood as the ‘meaning’ and
involved ‘a sense of apprehending the meaning’, ultimate intellectual interpretants could only be ‘habits’;
not any habits, but ‘self-controlled 
habits’ (EP II: 430f.). By habit, Peirce meant a ‘conditional general resolution to act’ (CP 5.402 n3). This
characterization of the interpretant was made on the explicit assumption that semiosis is end-directed; that
interpretation can only occur for the sake of some end (Short 2004: 230). Even though they were developed
to characterize human semiosis, these very general definitions of signs and interpretants allowed Peirce and
his followers to extend the field of semiotics beyond humanity to the study of semiosis in the rest of nature.
Peirce suggested that ‘all this universe is perfused with signs, if it is not composed exclusively of signs’ (EP
II: 394).
Peirce’s efforts to characterize semiosis in this way was the basis for his solution to how to conceive
ourselves as being part of and having evolved within nature. Through an analysis of chance, causation and
semiosis he went on show how purposeful behaviour could be understood. Actual causation, as distinct from
the causality of cause-effect relations which are really abstractions from causation, consists of events in an
ongoing process (Hulswit 2001: 342). Efficient causation ‘is a compulsion determined by the particular
condition of things… acting to make that situation begin to change in a perfectly determinate way’ (EP II:
120). However, Peirce argued that the limiting of possibilities associated with such determination is never
complete, so there is still an element of indeterminacy in the universe (EP I: 308). In fact such limiting of
possibilities was explained by Peirce as the outcome of chance variations. When types of variations are
selected so that there is a practically irreversible tendency, then we can characterize this as a ‘final
causation’ (Short 2004: 330f.). Peirce defined final causation as ‘that mode of bringing facts about according
to which a general description of results is made to come about, quite irrespective of any compulsion for it
to come about in this or that particular way; although the means may be adapted to the end’ (EP II: 120). A
sign could be seen as a final cause in this way, and as such, could be a purpose. As Peirce put it: ‘Every
sufficiently complete symbol is a final cause of, and “influences,” real events, in precisely the same sense in
which my desire to have the window open … influences the physical facts of my rising from my chair,
going to the window, and opening it’ (EP II: 317). Since nature is not entirely habituated and there are still
open possibilities, such purposeful action is to some extent free action. This semiotic account of free,
purposeful action involved reworking Kant’s analysis of schema of cognition, with productive imagination
and understanding unified, and then ‘transformed into a creative functioning of habit, dispositional
tendencies, or purposive activity as generative of schematic possibilities’ (Rosenthal, 2007: 1). A person
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was then characterized as ‘nothing but a symbol involving a general idea’ (EP I: 350), and mind as a
semiotic node. In accordance with Fichte’s, Schelling’s and Hegel’s critiques of Kant, this justified an
essentially social conception of cognition and thought.
Peirce divided the study of semiosis into three branches, speculative grammar, speculative critic, and
speculative rhetoric (where ‘speculative’ meant ‘theory of’) (EP II: 297ff.). Speculative grammar studies
modes of signifying in general. As Torkild Thelefsen argued, it can only be properly understood through
Peirce’s evolutionary metaphysics and interpreted in this way enables us to situate the distinctive place of
humans and culture within nature (Thelefsen, 2001). Here Peirce attempted to characterize signs and classify
all possible signs, concluding at one stage (he later went on to offer further classifications) that:
Signs are divisible by three trichotomies; first, according as the sign in itself is a mere quality, is 
an actual existent, or is a general law; secondly, according as the relation of the sign to its object 
consists in the sign's having some character in itself, or in some existential relation to that 
object, or in its relation to an interpretant; thirdly, according as its Interpretant represents it as a 
sign of possibility or as a sign of fact or a sign of reason. (CP: 2.243) 
Analysing these semiotic trichotomies and Peirce’s classification of signs, Thelefsen suggested that the first
trichotomy, the pre-perceptive signs, (Qualisign, Sinsign and Legisign) can be seen as signs of nature, the
second trichotomy, the perceptive signs (Icon, Index and Symbol), as signs of humans or human cognition,
and the third dichotomy (Rheme, Dicisign and Argument), as signs of culture. The signs of the first
trichotomy are monadic; to understand them we are forced to explain something that is inexplicable, but
they are the preconditions for the other signs. The second trichotomy, human cognition, is dyadic. It
describes a relationship between sign and object without any interpretation. The third trichotomy is triadic
and presupposes the previous two, adding to these a further relation. It is only through this third trichotomy
that it is possible to understand the relationship between the first and second trichotomies of signs. Humans
have evolved from a world of natural signs, so nature is a First, that is, a monadic realm of possibilities.
Humans are part of nature but differentiated from it, a Second, that is, a dyadic relation. The capacity to
cognize through Icons, Indexes and Symbols has displaced us from nature so that we can only know it
through representations. These representations have formed our culture, which is a Third, that is, a triadic
relation. But it is through culture that we can understand nature, including our (and our culture’s) emergence
from it. That is, we think as cultural beings, but can only do so as individual human beings presupposing
unprethinkable being and existent objects that have developed within it.
The second and third branches of semiotics are built on and presuppose the first. Speculative critic, is ‘the
science of the necessary conditions of the attainment of truth’ (CP: 1.445), or ‘the ways in which a sign can
be related to an object independent of it’ (EP II: 327). This pertains to what in the speculative grammar is
classified as ‘argument’, and includes the study of abduction, deduction and induction. Abduction is the
only logical operation which introduces any new idea. It involves the development of an hypothesis to
explain what surprises us, given our previous expectations, and then to ‘hold to it provisionally so long as
the facts will permit’ (Peirce, 1992: 142). Its end is ‘through subjection to the test of experiment, to lead to
the avoidance of all surprise and to the establishment of a habit of positive expectation that shall not be
disappointed’ (Peirce 1955: 267). However, he rejected the notion that scientific hypotheses are merely
concerned with prediction. It must also connect facts ‘with our general conceptions of the universe’ (Peirce,
1955: 267). Science and metaphysics are indissociable. ‘Find a scientific man who proposes to get along
without metaphysics’ Peirce wrote, ‘and you have found one whose doctrines are thoroughly vitiated by the
crude and uncriticized metaphysics with which they are packed’ (CP: 1-129). Opposing the positivists
Peirce defended ‘the intellectual part of our knowledge’ (Peirce, 1955: 268). He defended analogy (EP I: 35)
and metaphor, noting that ‘Metaphysics has been said contemptuously to be a fabric of metaphors. But not
only metaphysics, but logical … concepts need to be clothed in such garments. For a pure idea without
metaphor … is an onion without a peel’ (EP II: 392). However, he never discussed metaphor in relation to
abduction. Deduction Peirce characterized as the means by which ‘we predict the special results of the
general course of things, and how often they will occur in the long run’ (Peirce, 1992: 141). Elsewhere he
wrote: ‘Deduction is the only necessary reasoning. It is the reasoning of mathematics. It starts from a
hypothesis, the truth or falsity of which has nothing to do with the reasoning; and of course its conclusions
are equally ideal’ (EP II: 205) Deduction also deals with probabilities. Inductive reasoning he characterized
as ‘a course of experimental investigation’, and an experiment as ‘a question put to nature’ (EP II: 215).
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The third branch of semiotics, speculative rhetoric, is ‘the science of the essential conditions under which a
sign may determine an interpretant sign of itself and of whatever it signifies, or may, as a sign, bring about a
physical result’ (EP II: 326). That is, it is relevant to both examining how people’s interpretations of objects
are changed and how their actions and ways of living are changed by signs. Peirce ascribed ‘photographs,
telephones, and wireless telegraphs, as well as the sum total of all the work that steam engines have ever
done’ to the rhetoric of Bacon’s Novum Organum (EP II: 326f.) Apart from pointing out the ubiquity of 
rhetoric, particularly in relation to presenting arguments, Peirce did little work on this aspect of semiosis. 
Along with classifying signs, Peirce was also concerned to classify objects and interpretants. Objects were
classified as the Immediate Object, ’the object as cognized in the sign’ (EP II: 495) or ‘the Object as the
Sign represents it’ (EP II: 482) and the Dynamic Object, ‘the really efficient but not immediately present
object,’ (EP II: 482) or ‘the Object in such relations as unlimited and final study would show it to be’ (EP II:
495). Dynamical Objects were further classified as ‘Possibles’, ‘Occurrences’, or ‘Collections’ (EP II: 489),
and Peirce acknowledged that some Dynamical Objects are ‘altogether fictive’ (EP II 498). Dynamical
Objects were also referred to as ‘real objects’, and he suggested that a ‘“real object” … by ‘some kind of
causation or influence … must have determined the significant character of a sign’ (EP II: 409). Elsewhere
he referred to them as ‘Dynamoid Objects’, which he claimed were capable of the three modalities:
‘possible’, ‘existent’, and ‘Necessitant’ (EP II: 480). Dynamical Objects were characterized as what
Dynamical or Objective science can investigate (EP II: 495). They are presupposed by Immediate Objects,
but can only be indicated by a hint or by being indicated, leaving the interpreter to find them by ‘collateral
experience’ (EP II: 480). These characterizations suggest that Peirce had not fully worked out his definition
of Objects, a suggestion supported by his having noted that his division into two classes of Object is
incomplete (EP II: 495).
In classifying Interpretants, Peirce also distinguished the Immediate Interpretant (‘the Interpretant
represented or signified in the Sign’) from the Dynamical Interpretant (the ‘effect actually produced on the
mind by the Sign’), but also recognized a third interpretant, the Normal Interpretant, (the ‘effect that would
be produced on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought’). (EP II: 482) Later, he
referred to the Ultimate or Final interpretant rather than Normal Interpretant, and characterized this as the
‘Significance’ of the sign; that is, the lessons learnt from the sign (EP II: 498). The Normal or Final
Interpretant is the final consensus that communities of inquirers aim at in their scientific investigations.
While Peirce did not discuss the classes of objects and interpretants as extensively as he discussed those of
signs, as with his characterization of signs, it is clear that he was concerned to explain the creative activity
involved in interpretation as a physical process within nature. It is in his discussion of Objects, and
particularly Dynamical Objects, that Peirce is at his most enigmatic, and this, I suggest, is because he was
striving to provide a solution to the Schellingian problematic of upholding both what nowadays would be
called ‘realism’ and ‘constructivism’.
Through this sketch of Peirce’s semiotic theory we can see how Peirce advanced the Schellingian project of
conceiving humans as cultural beings which have evolved as part of and within nature, and how this
provides the means to characterize reason and explain how the sciences of nature and of humanity are
possible, and how people can be understood to act purposively, and how people can be physically changed
by arguments.
Re-examining the History of the Discovery of Global Warming
Interpreted in this way, how does Peirce’s semiotics illuminate the crisis we are facing, and where is it
deficient? First, we need to look more closely at the history of climate science. With the publication of
Spencer Weart’s The Discovery of Global Warming, first as a book and now as an online hypertext, 
continuously updated, we now have a detailed account of the developments in science which led to the 
present scientific consensus. It shows this development to have taken place over a much longer time span 
and to have been far more complex than suggested above.
Work by Joseph Fourier in the 1820s enabled scientists to appreciate that gases in the atmosphere might trap
the heat received from the sun and account for the warmth of the Earth above what would be expected from
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incoming radiant energy from the Sun alone. However, this possibility aroused little interest among
scientists until they began to consider evidence of glaciers having existed throughout Europe in places
where they would not be expected. How could these be accounted for? One hypothesis was that the climate
of the past had been radically different from climate in the present; at times it had been much colder. It was
this which raised interest in whether the composition of the atmosphere could account for vast changes in
climate. In 1859, John Tyndall showed that water vapor, carbon dioxide and methane were opaque to
infrared light and so could act as greenhouse gases. In 1896 a Swedish scientist, Svante Arrhenius,
completed calculations showing that halving the amount of CO 2 in the atmosphere would reduce the
temperature of Europe by some 4-5 °C. He then calculated that doubling the CO 2 in the atmosphere would
raise the temperature by 5-6 °C, but his main interest was in the causes of the ice ages. However, Arrhenius’
colleague, Arvid H ögbom who had been studying how carbon dioxide cycles through natural geo-chemical
processes, then calculated the amounts of CO 2 emitted by factories and other sources.
The possibility that CO 2 could cause global warming was dismissed after Knut Ängstr öm experimented
with a tube of CO 2 equivalent to the amount of the gas in a column of air to the top of the atmosphere. He 
showed that CO 2 is so opaque to infrared radiation that doubling the amount of it in the atmosphere would 
make no difference. Later, meteorologists argued on the basis of spectral absorption studies that the much 
more plentiful water vapour already blocked the same wavelengths as CO 2, suggesting the amount of CO 2 
in the atmosphere was irrelevant. Skepticism generated by this work was reinforced by what became a 
universal conviction, based on the work of ecologists and biogeochemists such as Vladimir Vernadsky and 
G.E. Hutchinson, who argued that climate on Earth formed part of a self-regulating equilibrium. The oceans 
absorb fifty times more CO 2 than enters the atmosphere, and it was assumed that more CO 2 in the 
atmosphere would stimulate the growth of plants which would restore the balance. Also, more heat would 
increase cloud cover which would reflect solar radiation. 
Consequently, meteorologists initially gave little credence to the lone voice of an English engineer, Guy 
Stewart Callander who, in 1938, criticised such arguments and again proposed that increasing CO 2 could 
account for what seemed to be increasing temperatures. His subsequent crusade, however, did revive some 
interest in the conjecture. Then vastly increased expenditure on meteorological research generated by the 
military in USA during and after World War II enabled costly experiments to be undertaken which 
invalidated the arguments against greenhouse gases causing global warming. It was shown that spectral 
absorption varied at different pressures and temperatures, and CO 2 and water vapour did not have identical 
spectral absorption lines. Increasing levels of CO 2 would have a greenhouse effect after all. The 
development of digital computers facilitated calculations of the transmission of radiation through the 
atmosphere. On this basis Gilbert N. Plass, who was still mainly interested in accounting for the ice ages, 
suggested that climate change caused by greenhouse gases could be a major problem in the future. 
Meanwhile, the study of isotopes of carbon and oxygen by Cesare Emiliani using techniques of mass 
spectrometry and of sampling of sediments using cores was providing means of estimating from fossil 
forminifera shells the history of temperature changes stretching back nearly 300,000 years (although 
interpreting the results gave rise to extended disputes). At the same time, studies of ratios of carbon isotopes 
revealed how much atmospheric CO 2 had been generated by fossil fuels. Work by the oceanographer, 
Roger Revelle, showed that the oceans would absorb far less CO 2 than previously thought, but this was not 
taken seriously until in 1959 two Swedish meteorologists, Bert Bolin and Erik Eriksson, clarified the 
argument. In 1960 C.D. Keeling accurately measured the amount of CO 2 in the atmosphere and detected an
annual rise. 
Yet given the insignificant contribution by humans to greenhouse gases compared to all greenhouse gases,
particularly water vapour, there did not seem to be a problem. That there was a problem became apparent
when the atmosphere was again treated as a system, and this time it was realized that systems need not be
stable. In the late 1950s a group led by Dave Fultz carried out tabletop ‘dishpan’ experiments using a
rotating fluid to simulate the circulation of the atmosphere. They found that a very slight perturbation could
flip the circulation pattern between distinct modes. A small change could effect a huge change. In the 1960s,
a Soviet climatologist concerned with plans to redirect rivers away from the Arctic Ocean, Mikhail Budyko,
pursued calculations showing how change in ice cover, by changing  the amount of radiation reflected, could
further the same effect, leading to an ice age or to runaway global warming, challenging the assumption of a
global balance. This challenge was reinforced when in 1963 Fritz Möller pointed out that small increases in
CO 2, by increasing temperatures, could result in large increases in water vapour, greatly magnifying its
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effect.
In the 1970s, however, most scientists still did not see greenhouse emissions as a serious problem. That
there was a close correlation between levels of CO 2 and temperature throughout Earth’s history was
confirmed in the 1980s by analysis of two kilometer long ice core samples from Antarctica. A study
published in 1987 showed that over 160,000 years CO 2 levels had varied from 180ppm in cold periods to
280ppm in warm periods. At that time CO 2 levels had already reached 350ppm. Two ice cores taken by
rival research teams from Greenland in 1993 revealed that Greenland had sometimes warmed 7 ˚C in less
than fifty years, and that there had been dramatic changes in the North Atlantic in as little as five years. In
2005, computer estimates indicated that at present the Earth is now taking in a watt per square metre more
than it is radiating back into space over the entire Earth surface.
The study of complex systems using computers suggests that throughout nature, changes which are the 
linear effects of causes tend to be islands of stability in a more turbulent environment characterized by 
non-linear relationships, confirming the insights of Futz and Budyko. In such circumstances, changes that 
appear to be manifestations of linear relationships between causes and effects can lead to bifurcation points 
where huge changes can occur very rapidly with only very small changes of inputs, moving to a different 
stable state or even becoming chaotic. Computer models of the climate and ocean currents indicating the 
possibility of such dramatic changes concurred with the evidence available through the study of ice cores. 
This in turn revealed that other observations based on examination of tree rings or pollen in sediments 
revealing dramatic changes in the environment, which had previously been regarded as mere anomalies, 
should have been taken more seriously. However, appreciation of the possibility of very rapid changes in the
environment has not yet been absorbed by geoscientists, let alone economists and the general community. 
As Weart noted in 2003:
In the 1950s, a few scientists found evidence that some of the great climate shifts in the past had
taken only a few thousand years. During the 1960s and 1970s, other lines of research made it 
plausible that the global climate could shift radically within a few hundred years. In the 1980s 
and 1990s, further studies reduced the scale to the span of a single century. Today, there is 
evidence that severe change can take less than a decade. A committee of the National Academy 
of Sciences (NAS) has called this reorientation in the thinking of scientists a veritable 
"paradigm shift." The new paradigm of abrupt global climate change, the committee reported in 
2002, "has been well established by research over the last decade , but this new thinking is little 
known and scarcely appreciated in the wider community of natural and social scientists and 
policymakers." (Weart, 2003b, 30) 
For instance, the melting of permafrost releases methane, which is a much more potent greenhouse gas than
carbon dioxide. The West Siberian bog, which has begun to melt, by itself is estimated to contain 70 billion
tons of gas, equivalent to 73 years of manmade carbon dioxide emissions at current levels (Monbiot, 2006:
11). Climate scientists at the Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research has predicted that parts of
the Amazon rainforest will be turned to desert by 2050, releasing vast amounts of carbon dioxide (Brown,
1998, 1). The most frightening prospect of all is that heating of the oceans could release methane from
‘clathrates’ (methane hydrates), ice-like substances found in the sea beds around the world. Kept solid by
the pressure and cold of overlying water, these contain more carbon than all the reserves of oil and coal in
the world put together, all of which could be released very quickly if the temperature of the ocean were
increased too much. What we appear to be facing is a cascade of changes generating further warming.
It now appears that the entire rise of human civilization has taken place in a warm period of the Earth’s
history more stable than at any period in the last 400,000 years (Weart, 2003a: 186). But this stability will
only be sustained within certain limits. It is possible that we have already disrupted this regime so severely
that these positive feedback loops will overwhelm the negative feedback loops maintaining this stable state,
undermining its stability and making its breakdown inevitable. This is the argument of James Lovelock.
Lovelock’s idea of Gaia, the Earth as a self-organizing system acting teleologically to maintain the
conditions for life on Earth, was really a revival and development of the notion of the biosphere developed
by Alexander von Humboldt (influenced by Schelling), Eduard Suess, Vernadsky and Hutchinson
(Grinevald, 1988), and initially Lovelock, like Hutchinson, had assumed that Gaia was so robust that it
would be difficult for humans to adversely affect it. It was others who embraced this concept and used it to
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advance concern for environmental destruction. But, following developments in climate science, Lovelock
changed his mind. As he put it:
I knew that our self-regulating Earth had evolved from those organisms that left a better 
environment for their progeny and by the elimination of those who fouled their habitat, but I 
never realized just how destructive we were, or that we had so grievously damaged the Earth 
that Gaia now threatens us with the ultimate punishment of extinction (Lovelock, 2006, 147).
Lovelock has embraced the paradigm shift.
Central to Lovelock’s argument are the findings from a study of the Eocene period 55 million years ago.
Work on this has been based on research on marine sediments, which can now be dated with some accuracy.
A rapid drop in ratios of Carbon-13 to Carbon-12 in fossils at this time can best be explained as due to a
massive increase in methane in the atmosphere, possibly caused by the melting of clathrates. The result was
a rapid increase in temperature of between 5 ° and 8 °C, with this hot regime lasting for 200,000 years. The
methane would have oxidized in the air, and it is this, Lovelock suggests, which would have sustained the
temperature change for so long. The effects were dramatic. There is evidence of massive extinctions, and
while the poles heated up, with sea surface temperatures at the poles being in the vicinity of 23 °C and
supportive of life, the land and oceans at lower latitudes became so hot that they were rendered barren. This
meant that the living processes which normally remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere were greatly
slowed down.
The Rhetoric of Global Warming
Along with the emerging consensus within science, there has been a growth of rhetoric by scientists 
concerned to convince other scientists to take their work seriously and to alert the public and politicians of 
the need to act to avoid the destructive consequences of global warming. The rhetorical aspect internal to 
science is associated with the struggle of scientists to convince other scientists to accept their conclusions, to 
gain co-operation in their research, to gain funding for further research, to form research teams, to develop 
disciplines and institutions within which research can be supported, and to achieve co-operation between 
different disciplines and institutions, both within nations and between nations, and to gain practical support 
from prestigious scientific bodies such as the US National Academy of Science. Influencing the public at 
large has involved making public statements, attempting to influence journalists and making representations 
and recommendations to politicians. Rhetorical work involves convincing people that science now has the 
evidence that global warming is a reality, and that humans are responsible and pointing out what are the 
likely effects, and consequently the need for drastic action. However, there are complications in such 
rhetorical work. One of the most important aspects of this is gaining and retaining credibility, of individuals,
disciplines, and science itself. In this regard scientists are in a paradoxical situation in that their credibility 
depends to a considerable extent on being seen to be above economics and politics, but they must somehow 
gain the economic means to do their work, and this depends largely on having political support. Claiming 
that we are facing a major threat has served to gain funding for further research, but scientists in the US have
come under pressure to misrepresent their findings and those who have spoken out on this issue have 
sometimes lost funding, and in Australia, have been retrenched. Weart has described this campaign within 
USA, the resistance it has encountered and its successes. 
Weart has also described the growing opposition to these climate scientists. In some cases, opposition has 
come from other scientists, although generally not climate scientists, and those scientists who have opposed 
the claims about global warming generally have not published their own claims in refereed journals. 
However, they have had a major impact because they are widely circulated in publications sponsored by 
conservative groups and industrial interests. And Weart noted:
In the forefront was the Global Climate Coalition, generously funded by dozens of major 
corporations in the petroleum, automotive, and other industries. With slick publications and 
videos sent wholesale to journalists, plus extensive personal lobbying in Washington and at 
international meetings, the Coalition did much to persuade leaders who were ignorant of science
that there was no sound reason to worry about climate change. Enough of the public was 
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likewise sufficiently persuaded by the skeptical advertising and news reports, or at least 
sufficiently confused by them, so that the administration felt free to avoid taking serious steps 
against global warming (Weart, 2003: 168).
Weart’s account of the work of anti-environmentalists only hints at the immensity of what Monbiot aptly
characterized as ‘the denial industry’ (Monbiot: 20ff.). This involves huge public relations campaigns,
setting up or supporting spurious scientific institutes and journals, setting up websites to disseminate
misinformation and financing think tanks around the world to mount a misinformation campaign and focus
attention away from meaningful action on global warming. The world’s largest oil company, ExxonMobil,
has been particularly active in this regard, and according to a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists,
has ‘spent millions of dollars to deceive the public about global warming’ (Schulman, 2007: 3). Such
corporations have also infiltrated legitimate environmentalist groups while setting up bogus
environmentalist groups to pre-empt debates on the environment and deflect criticism from business
corporations. They have pressured governments to shape government communications on global warming,
increase control over academic institutions and to constrain public debate. Most facets of this have been
examined by Sharon Beder in Global Spin: The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism, which concludes:
Surveys show that the majority of people in most countries are not only concerned about the 
environment: they think environmental protection should be regulated by government action 
and given priority over economic growth. Yet this widespread public concern is not translating 
into government action because of the activities of large corporations that are seeking to subvert
or manipulate the popular will (Beder, 2000: 273).
The most effective strategy pursued by the denial industry is to ‘perpetuate the myth of a lack of
international scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change – and thereby succeed in maintaining
public confusion’ (Antilla, 2005: 350). This has been achieved in newspapers by reporting diverse claims by
scientists with the appearance of balance, but failing to distinguish between scientists whose findings have
been defended successfully in peer reviewed journals and those scientists bought by the public relations
industry to caste doubt on the consensus achieved.
Finally, there is the rhetoric of the environmentalists who broadcast the findings of the scientists, strive to 
counter the efforts to subvert their message, and point out the implications of this message to the general 
public. The works of Gore, Weart, Beder and Monbiot are examples of such rhetorical work.
Interpreting Climate Science Through Peircian Semiotics
What light can this more detailed account of the discovery of global warming throw on the adequacy of
Peircian semiotics? To some extent, it highlights the superiority of the Peircian semiotic theory of science.
What the discovery of global warming shows is the central role and power of abduction in science. The
hypothesis that the composition of the atmospheric might account for past ice ages was clearly inspired by
experiences that did not fit with expectations, notably evidence of past glaciers where they should not have
been. Hypotheses guided inductive research which can best be understood as the interpretation of signs. The
development of and incorporation into science of instruments of measurement, enabling a far greater range
of phenomena to be appreciated as and interpreted as signs, indicates the underestimated importance of
Peirce’s semiotic theory of perception, and the importance he accorded to exosomatic devices of thought, to
science. Abduction, deduction and induction have guided each other, with abduction being stimulated by
failure of expectation, with deductive explication of and demonstration from theories using models, made
easier by computers built on the deductive logic that Peirce had participated in developing and induction
involving putting questions to nature and searching for signs which could only be interpreted through
theories arrived at by earlier abduction. One aspect of semiosis clarified by the development of climate
science is the relationship between diverse scientists. Conclusions reached through one enquiry frequently
contradicted in some measure conclusions or expectations derivable from conclusions reached in another
inquiry, sometimes from different disciplines. Much scientific work involved addressing these conflicts of
expectations. Sometimes, this led to conclusions which led to the suppression of ideas which later were seen
to be valid. However, it was when expectations deriving from diverse investigations corroborated each
other, especially when evidence came from different disciplines, that evidence was found to be most
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convincing. Out of this quest for coherence, climate science has evolved towards a general theory of the
climate, and more broadly of the Earth as a whole, and in doing so has fitted in with a general movement in
science away from a mechanistic world-view which allowed us to look upon nature as a mere resource to be
exploited, to a ‘process’ world-view according to which we have to see ourselves as possibly destructive
participants in nature’s creative becoming.
Using Peirce’s analysis and classification of signs to analyse any particular instance of semiosis is
notoriously difficult, as Nathan Houser observed in his introduction to The Essential Peirce (EP I: xxxvii). It
is not difficult to show in a general way that the development of climate science involved Arguments
(abduction, deduction and induction), Dicisigns (propositions) and Rhemes (terms), formulated as Symbols
(conventional signs), but utilizing Indexes (such as varieties of pollen in sediments indicating past
temperatures) and Icons (as in the diagrams representing the relationship between CO 2 and temperature
over time), which in turn were based on the first trichotomy of signs, Qualisigns (qualities, such as the
colour of the pollen), Sinsigns (actual existents, the individuals that exist) and Legisigns (general laws, or
‘habits’ or ‘tendencies’, or types – the propensity of individual pollen to endure and behave in a certain way
which enables them to be identified as types). But it is another matter to classify the sign types (as for
instance, whether signs are ‘Rhematic, Iconic Qualisigns’ or ‘Rhematic Iconic Sinsigns’) or show that
nothing has been left out by this analysis; and later, Peirce developed a more complex analysis of signs
based on ten rather than three triadic divisions. What is more significant is that characterizing logic as
semiotic and thereby treating humans as embodied and active as well as reflective parts of the world they are
investigating has revealed dimensions of science to which Peirce’s neo-Kantian and empiricist predecessors
and the later logical positivists were blind.
Peirce appears more limited when it comes to comprehending rhetorical work. While he pointed out the 
ubiquity and variety of efforts to change the ideas of others, he devoted little time to examining ideological 
struggles, including efforts to deceive, and seemed to have no place for examining the power struggles 
between political movements of which these ideological struggles are a part. The focus of his work on 
rhetoric was too limited. 
What needs to be looked at to comprehend this deficiency are more fundamental issues associated with
Peirce’s efforts to explain the possibility of semiosis through which objects of nature are culturally
represented by people who are still part of nature. As part of the struggle to overcome Cartesian dualism and
the mechanistic world-view, this is one of the most profound aspects of Peirce’s philosophy; but it is fraught
with difficulties, and it is this that I want to focus upon. In particular, it is necessary to examine more closely
the problematic concept of the Dynamical Object. On this basis, I will argue for significant revisions in
Peirce’s characterization of what exists, which will be used to refine and extend Peirce’s causal analysis of
semiosis and of teleology. I will examine whether this could be used to justify Lovelock’s treatment of Gaia
as a living being to which goals are ascribed. This revision will then be used to supplement Peirce’s analysis
of ‘community’ in such a way that the complexities of social relations, ideological conflicts and of power
struggles can be better comprehended. I will argue that this provides both an explanation for the failure of
humanity to respond to the discoveries of climate scientists, and provides the basis for more effective
rhetoric in Peirce’s sense for environmentalists struggling to achieve a more adequate response to global
warming.
The Problem of Objects
What should be almost immediately obvious from Weart’s history of the discovery of global warming is that
the Dynamic Object being investigated was not global warming as such. Different disciplines with different
interests were contributing ideas which eventually led to the overwhelming acceptance by scientists that
human emitted greenhouse gases are causing global warming, but the objects being investigated have been
for the most part different theoretical objects inaccessible and even incomprehensible to normal experience.
The objects that originally had been investigated were the rock formations and marks on rocks which
geologists had associated with glaciers being found where, according to their expectations, they should not
have been. These came to be seen as signs of ancient glaciers, that is, objects which no longer exist.
Originally this was only one of a number of hypotheses and was only accepted after finding collateral
evidence for it. Once this had been accepted, then these no longer existing glaciers, or perhaps signs of their
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having existed, could be treated as signs of low temperatures.
Interpreting such signs then presented another challenge to previous expectations, calling forth another
hypothesis, made possible by Fourier’s earlier work, that such changes of temperature could be correlated
with changing concentrations in the atmosphere of greenhouse gases. The relationship between temperature
and concentrations of different gases then became the object to be investigated. Clarifying the relation
between carbon dioxide and temperature over hundreds of thousands of years involved finding signs which
could be taken as records of past temperatures. To identify these as signs required advanced physics and
chemistry and the development of complex sampling and measuring techniques, which themselves became
objects to be investigated in order to uphold the hypothesis that there was such a causal relationship. In the
case of Emiliani’s argument that the ratio of isotopes of oxygen in fossil forminifera shells was an effect of
temperature in the oceans, so that by carbon dating the shells this ratio could be taken as a record of
temperature, further work showed the argument to be flawed. Nevertheless, it appeared there is still a
correlation. Because during glacial periods more O-16 evaporates than O-18 and then is stored in the
glaciers, concentrations of it in the oceans decrease, resulting in less O-16 and more O-18 in the shells. The
ratios, in conjunction with ratios of isotopes of carbon, were a record of temperature over time, but only on
the basis of a different, more complex causal relationship than Emiliani had hypothesized (Weart, 2003: 49),
and ratios could only be characterized in terms of the behaviour of objects such as ‘isotopes’ which are
theoretical constructs. Such work made it possible to deduce that industry emissions of carbon dioxide
would affect climate, and it was only against this background that apparent increases in temperature became
an object to be investigated and in relation to which signs were then interpreted.
Mere correlations were still not enough, however. Before the significance of changes in levels of carbon
dioxide could be properly interpreted it was necessary to have some comprehension of how global climate,
oceans, geological and biotic systems functioned as systems and how changes in each could cause changes
in the others. Signs that suggested a close relation between greenhouse gases and the temperature of Earth
had to be seen as features of a global climate system, which increasingly became the Dynamical Object to be
investigated. Initially, this system had been assumed to be fairly stable, and this was the basis for dismissing
concerns that human activity, including the emission of greenhouse gases, could disrupt it. But it was
recognition of it as a system that allowed scientists to appreciate that it could become unstable, and that it
could switch to different regimes, and that a small change could be amplified, triggering major changes to
the whole system. Later, it came to be appreciated that it could become chaotic or develop in more complex
ways. It also came to be appreciated that the way the climatic system operated could not be understood in
complete abstraction from the dynamics of the oceans, from geological processes and from the activity and
dynamics of various life forms, ranging from cells to the biosphere, all of which could undergo dramatic
transitions to different regimes. It is in this context that the global ecosystem or ‘Gaia’ emerged as the
appropriate object of investigation in relation to which the various correlations and dynamics had to be
understood. While this Dynamical Object had been conjectured to exist for some time, it was with the
development of computer modeling that its dynamics could be properly appreciated. Along with this, it
came to be recognized that the era in which humans have flourished is itself a particular regime or system
within ‘Gaia’. What these developments reveal is the problematic nature of defining the objects being
studied.
What Are Objects?
So what is the status of these objects? As discussed and thought about, they are Immediate Objects, but they
are considered as such in relation to Dynamical or Scientific Objects being investigated. There is something
right about Peirce’s distinction between Immediate Objects and Dynamical Objects, an important element of
which is captured by David Bohm when he noted:
… whatever we say a thing is, it isn’t. First of all, whatever we say is words, and what we want
to talk about is generally not words. Second, whatever we mean by what way is not what the 
thing actually is, though it may be similar. For the thing is always more that what we mean and 
is never exhausted by our concepts. And the thing is also different from what we mean, if only 
because no thought can be absolutely correct when it is extended indefinitely. The fact that a 
thing has qualities going beyond whatever we think and say about it is behind our notion of 
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objective reality (Bohm & Peat, 2000: 8). 
Non-fictional Dynamical Objects are parts of the physical universe. But as the history of climate science
shows, except in the early stages of investigation, they cannot be simply indicated as that which scientific
investigators come across in their engagement in the world, and to the extent that they can be, these early
objects of investigation tend to be displaced by theoretically constructed objects. They are, as Gaston
Bachelard argued, theoretical objects different from the objects of normal experience (Tiles, 1984: 125). As
such they are inter-related, so that examination of a particular object presupposes an understanding of
diverse other theoretical objects to make their investigation possible. These theoretical objects constrain
what kind of hypotheses can be taken seriously. Does this mean that, as Bachelard argued, science leaves
behind the objects of common experience as it develops and finally deals with objects that are simply the
products of its own activity? Would this mean that there would only be Immediate Objects? If we accept
this, we would have abandoned what appeared to be the solution Peirce had provided to the conflict between
realism and constructivism. In the present case, however, Bachelard’s neo-Kantian position appears weak,
since it is clear that there is something beyond scientific thought in the threat that we face, whether we
acknowledge or understand this threat or not. This supports the view, attributed to Peirce by Hausman, that
Dynamical Objects are ‘centers of resistance’ so that ‘interpretation is constrained as it grows and is
embodied in Immediate Objects’ (Hausman, 1987: 389). But when this objective reality is simultaneously
postulated to be that which we are talking about, a theoretical construct which involves saying something
about it as the condition for us saying something about it, postulated to be the efficient cause somehow
determining the signs through which we discuss it, there still seems to be a problem.
How can Peirce’s insights be defended? One way of defending Peirce’s position is as a form of what Roy
Bhaskar called ‘transcendental realism’. Partly in response to Bachelard, Bhaskar argued that we must
presuppose the reality of theoretical objects of a particular kind (associated with the reality of ‘generative
mechanisms’) as the condition for the possibility of science (Bhaskar, 1994: 45ff.). While this does seem to
capture to some extent Peirce’s position, Peirce is offering something stronger. Effectively, Peirce is
examining the transcendental conditions for any kind of thinking at all, not just scientific thinking. As
Thellefsen showed, for Peirce reflective thought presupposes more basic kinds of signs, although it is only
through the highest forms that these pre-perceptive signs can be thought about and discussed. This form of
analysis derives from Peirce’s categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness and underlies all his
philosophy. Following Schelling, Peirce took the semiosis involved in action as more basic and as a
condition for reflective thought to have any meaning, although this priority could only be defended through
reflective thought. Science was then seen not just as ideas about the world but as doing experiments, that is,
putting questions to nature without ever being able to be sure what the answers will be, and scientific ideas
and concepts presuppose such experiments and the activity of performing them. That is, Peirce assumed that
as actors we are bodily engaged in the physical world which confronts us as ‘Brute fact’ or ‘reactive
existence’. This world can physically impact upon us according not only to its own tendencies or ‘habits’,
but also to our bodily form. Such engagement with reactive existence presupposes in turn ‘germinal being’.
The significance of this for Peircian thought can be clarified through further developments in semiotics;
notably, through Martin Krampen’s and Kalevi Kull’s defence of ‘phytosemiotics’, the semiosis of plants
(Kull, 2000: 326-350). Krampen and Kull have argued that plant growth is itself an interpretant of signs.
Kull refers to ‘graviperception’ which regulates the growth of shoot and root tips (336), but underlying this
is the plant’s genome, a sign or complex of signs of its environment or ecological niche, including what
signs it is likely to find in this. Kull argued that it is not only plants which are characterized by this
vegetative semiosis. All animals have vegetative semiosis. For instance, with humans, the developments by
the fertilized egg of arms and legs, hands and feet which can grasp and run, and sensory organs of various
kinds which are sensitive to various physical objects or processes, are themselves interpretants of signs (i.e.
the genome) of their environment, anticipating the characteristics (habits) of what they are likely to interact
with in the future (Hoffmeyer, 1996: 20). The genome is clearly an index of the success of the form of the
parents to engage with their environments. Action by humans presupposes this vegetative semiosis which is
the condition for action. This is the case with scientific experiments as with everyday actions. The reflective
thinking which is made possible by and develops on the basis of the forms of semiosis that develop through
practical engagement with the environment not only presupposes this animal form of semiosis, but also the
vegetative semiosis which makes it possible. As Mark Johnson put it, the body is in the mind (Johnson,
1987). Thus, Peirce is justified in characterizing the nature of the universe as the condition for science prior
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to forms of scientific investigation which then reveal the nature of the world in detail.
If Peirce’s work can be defended as a form of transcendental realism, the same arguments can be used to
defend it as speculative metaphysics. Conceiving it in this way accords with Peirce’s own characterization
of his work, and despite current attitudes to speculative metaphysics, speculative metaphysics as Peirce
conceived it is more defensible than transcendental realism. As with transcendental realism, speculative
metaphysics must be concerned to specify the necessary conditions for there to be knowledge of the world,
including both the nature of the world itself and the nature of the knower, as essential to achieving a
consistent cosmology; but unlike transcendental philosophy, it makes no claim to providing definitive
answers. While based on observation (as Peirce argued) speculative metaphysics involves abduction and so
is fallible, with no pretensions to certainty. Dealing with the most general features of being, speculative
metaphysics is necessarily schematic, providing only an outline of the diverse particulars that are likely to
be found in the universe. As Peirce noted, ‘Its business is to study the most general features of reality and
real objects’ (Peirce, 1955: 314). Metaphysics as such then provides a preliminary characterization of any
and every thing that could be investigated, and also provides the  means to relate diverse inquiries, including
diverse scientific disciplines within science and the humanities and inquiries in everyday life, to each other.
It provides a bridge between common sense and science. As a characterization of the entire cosmos, it
provides the ultimate background against which particular facts need to be connected to be explained.
Peircian metaphysics, as a development of the Schellingian tradition, is first and foremost in opposition to
the mechanistic cosmology which is still a major force in the world, particularly in Anglophone countries,
and it is incumbent upon it to provide an account of the general features of reality and real objects able to
account for there being signs and semiosis.
Conceived as speculative metaphysics, it is clear that Piece’s work was incomplete. This brings us back to
the notion of ‘Objects’. Objects are absolutely central to Peirce’s theory of semiotics and to his contribution
to Schellingian metaphysics, but in Peirce this is a poorly developed notion. Writing for different audiences,
Peirce did not attempt to relate his speculations on the Object in the context of semiotics to his metaphysical
speculations. So, when characterizing Objects in relation to semiotics he wrote almost nothing about what
kind of objects do exist. Where he does engage in metaphysical speculation, he makes not attempt to
characterize Objects so that semiosis can be appreciated as an intelligible aspect of them. He focuses on
chance and habits within nature whereby nature evolves to become lawful, the concepts of space (suggesting
that space is non-Euclidian) and time, logic and mathematics. Existents are briefly mentioned as ‘entities’
associated with ‘the germ of a law’, seen as emerging in nature through chance (Peirce, 1992: 210). This is
the origin of those parts of nature which, through taking on habits, have become predictable and so can be
characterized by generals. But while Peirce claimed that the business of metaphysics is to study the general
features of real objects, he offered only brief suggestions on this topic. While he aligned himself with
dynamism (defending Boscovich) and argued for the reality of dynamic atoms, suggested that matter might
‘consist of vortices in a fluid which itself consists of far minuter solids, these, however, being themselves
vortices of a fluid, itself consisting of ultimate solids, and so on in endless alternation’ (Peirce, 1955: 68), of
points and instants, mentioned objects of various kinds, referred to possibles, occurrences and collectives,
molecules, organisms, minds and communities, no general claims were made for how existents sustain
themselves in existence. Their endurance was accounted for as the habits of nature, rather than of existents
themselves. Where objects are not merely the effects of something else, accounting for them requires some
notion of immanent causation.
Where Peirce comes closest to considering immanent causation is in his account of inward nature or internal 
cause. 
To begin with, Peirce unraveled the confusion in analyses of cause generated by mixing Aristotelian and
modern physics, pointing out the problems in abstracting ‘cause-effect’ relations from causal processes. At
the same time he defended the psychical experience of real becoming against the elimination of real
temporality in mechanics (Peirce, 1992: chap.6 & chap.7). Elsewhere, he offered his own characterization of
causation. Originally, he suggested three forms of causation whereby events come to pass: external
compulsion, inward nature and irregularity (EP I: 299). Later, reworking Aristotle’s doctrine of four causes,
Peirce divided causes according to whether they were defining or individuating, and whether they were
internal or external. He characterized efficient cause as the individuating external cause and the final cause 
as the defining external cause, and the formal cause or form as the defining internal cause and the material 
cause 
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as the individuating internal cause. Peirce held these internal causes to be part of what is caused (EP II:
315f.). ‘Internal cause’ appeared to correspond to what earlier he had referred to as ‘inward nature’.
However, Peirce had little to say on these internal causes. It appears that Peirce lacked the notion of
‘self-organization’. He was more concerned to defend the role of chance in nature as the source of necessity,
and to justify the concept of final causation. Although Dynamical Objects were characterized by Peirce as
‘efficient’ and as ‘some kind of causation’, when he drew his distinction between Immediate and Dynamical
Objects his analyses of causation were not mentioned. Nor was his argument that ‘Not only may generals be
real, but they may also be physically efficient 
…in the commonsense acceptation in which human purposes are physically efficient’ (EP II: 343).
It is possible that Peirce did not want to say much about Objects as such because Dynamical Objects,
although able to be indicated, were being treated by Peirce as something like Kantian things-in-themselves,
while ‘Immediate Objects’ included anything that could be thought about (Hausman, 1987; Rosenthal,
1990). Immediate Objects, which can be discussed, are only Dynamical Objects after ‘unlimited and final
study’ (EP II: 495) and so Dynamical Objects could not be properly characterized until there had been
unlimited and final study. But on the basis of Peirce’s characterization of metaphysics it is necessary to go
beyond this promise of future knowledge of Dynamical Objects and attempt to characterize the general
features of real Objects. Such a characterization might be ‘objectively vague’ in the sense that Peirce
defended such vagueness (EP II: 351), but it should be considerably more precise, and different, than the
common-sense notion of ‘object’. The fact that to bring Dynamical Objects into discourse is to render them
Immediate Objects, only means that any claim made about them as real objects is fallible and liable to future
correction.
Dynamical Objects as Dynamical Processes and Structures
It is in trying to characterize these general features of real Objects that Peirce’s metaphysics needs
supplementing by the Schellingian tradition – which has been centrally concerned with the notion of
‘self-organization’. The most common way of supplementing Peircian semiotics to provide a more adequate
notion of Objects is by incorporating the notion of system. Basic Dynamical Objects are assumed to be
systems or aspects of systems. But the classic notion of systems as developed by von Bertalanffy does not
do justice to Schelling, let alone the full Schellingian tradition. Schelling himself is important for having
emphasized that reality is constituted by constant activity which develops by limiting itself. Schelling
argued that community of causation or reciprocal action, which in the second edition of Critique of Pure 
Reason 
Kant had introduced as a derivative form of causation, was the primary form, with cause–effect relations
being abstractions from this (Schelling, 1978: 110). This closely parallels Peirce’s defence of ‘causation’
and his critique of the notion of ‘causality’ (Peirce, 1992: 198 & 220), but unlike Peirce, Schelling went on
to systematically characterize the nature of the existents that emerge in nature. Existents were seen by
Schelling as self-organising through being self-limiting, thereby being immanent causes of their own
existence. ‘Products’ (as forms or structures) were seen as being generated by activity and should be seen in
relation to this, although the nature of such activity can only be recognized as such through their products
(Schelling, 2004: 5f.). The appearance of dead matter in which products prevail over productivity he
explained as the outcome of a balance of forces. Organisms were characterized as actively resisting the
organizing tendencies within their environment, responding creatively to environmental changes to form and
reform themselves as products (Schelling, 2004: 51 & 54). Bergson, strongly influenced by Schelling’s
philosophy, emphasized the durational nature of becoming, and pointed out that processes vary in their
durations (as for instance, a melody requires a longer duration to be a melody than the notes which make it
up), this being essential to understanding their relationships. Bogdanov, also strongly influenced by
Schelling, developed a general theory of organization and examined the nature of cooperation and conflict
between organizations, the kinds of stability they could develop and the crises they could undergo, thereby
offering a more dynamic view of existents than mainstream systems theory (Bogdanov, 1984).
More recent work, often only very indirectly influenced by the Schellingian tradition, can also be interpreted
as advancing it. Much of this is associated with the study of organized complexity. There is more to
complexity theory than the ideas emerging from the Santa Fe Institute’s work on complex adaptive systems
and non-linear dynamical systems. Before the Santa Fe Institute, Conrad Waddington had characterized his
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work as the study of complexity, and developed the notion of self-stabilizing paths of development to
characterize epigenesis (the differentiation of cells and generation of form in the development of organisms
from embryos), and showed how this notion could be applied elsewhere (1975). This work stimulated the
development of catastrophe theory. Howard Pattee, attempting to characterize what distinguishes the living
from the lifeless, defined the basic problem in a way reminiscent of Peirce problematic: ‘What are the most
elementary physical requirements for molecules to function as symbols?’ (Pattee, 2001) Influenced by
Michael Polanyi’s hierarchical ontology, he came to the conclusion that to conceive the possibility of nature
representing itself required two irreducibly complementary concepts, dynamical laws and non-integrable
constraints. Having introduced the notion of constraint Pattee noted how constraints could be facilitative and
creative. For instance, the constraints of grammar make in possible for humans to communicate in much
more complex ways than other animals are capable. Pattee spelt out some implications of this notion of
constraint for a conception of life generally, including a sketch for a theory of language. He also
characterized his work as the study of complex systems (Pattee, 1973).
Pattee’s work was a major inspiration for the development of hierarchy theory in which a central place was
given to both constraints (limits) and to different process rates (durations) to characterize the relationship
between processes, effectively synthesizing Schelling and Bergson without having been directly influenced
by either (Allen and Starr, 1982; Salthe, 1985; Lemke, 2000). Those inspired by his work have rethought the
concept of causation as constraint (Juarrero, 2002: chap.9), and in this way have developed a more radical
form of complex systems theory than the views dominating the Santa Fe Institute. It gives a place for a
stronger form of emergence and for creative becoming through the interpolation of new levels of constraint,
thereby bridging the gap between science and the humanities (Juarrero, 2002: 222ff.). Despite the hiatus
between those influenced by Schelling and Bergson and those developing hierarchy theory, it is difficult not
to read the work of such thinkers as Stanley Salthe and Alicia Juarrero as refining and developing their
insights and as refining and developing Schelling’s, Bergson’s and Peirce’s characterization of causation,
and in fact, Salthe has recognized this heritage (Salthe, 1993: 57f.).
While Salthe and Juarrero still write of systems, which can be considered as ‘objects’ when they are
perceived or discussed, as actual existents they are conceived of as in process of becoming and essentially
durational. As such, they are essentially Dynamical Processes, to use a term from Schelling (Schelling,
2004: xxviii & 186), rather than Dynamical Objects. This does not mean that we need to think of all objects
investigated by science as Dynamical Processes, but processes are basic and what we can refer to as objects
are derivative; for instance stable patterns continually reproduced and maintained by processes, such as the
structures of molecules or rock formations, or aspects of processes considered from relatively much faster or
much slower rate processes, or metonyms for processes. Processes might be in process of becoming over
thousands, millions or billions of years. While time can be represented as an object, to do so does not do
justice to its durational, creative becoming. What is the alternative?
It is possible to characterize the appreciation of this durational becoming as a kind of ‘feeling’, the kind of
feeling associated with empathy, and this would accord with the place granted to feeling by Peirce in his
characterization of time in relation to mind (EP I: 321f.). Alternatively, we could embrace Bergson’s
defence of ‘intuition’ (following Schelling) as a way of knowing by which we grasp reality ‘from within’
(Bergson, 1965: 162). Another way of characterizing this grasp of reality from within is as ‘understanding’,
but what this means needs clarifying. Polanyi, extending ideas from Gestalt psychology on the experience of
being embodied and using tools, provided a fuller characterization and analysis of cognizing or knowing
what we are investigating ‘from within’ as ‘indwelling’ (Polanyi, 1969: 152ff.). He argued that whatever we
focus upon makes sense because it is experienced against a background of which we are tacitly aware. This
is the case even when we are explaining the solar system using Newtonian mechanics, but is more obvious
in the case of comprehending organisms. Again, music provides a good illustration of what is involved in
indwelling (although it does not give an adequate sense of our embodiment). What we hear at any moment is
experienced as significant because we ‘dwell within’ and have a tacit awareness of the whole piece of music
as an unfinished process of becoming which functions as the background to what we are currently listening
to. To some extent this notion of indwelling bridges the opposition between subject and object, especially
when what is ‘dwelt within’ is a process of becoming. The notion of indwelling in processes of becoming
also has the advantage that we no longer have to think of ourselves as outside that which we are
investigating and can interpret ourselves as parts of and as participants within such processes of becoming.
What I am suggesting is that it is through the cultivation of such tacit awareness by indwelling that we can
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appreciate real ‘Dynamical Processes’ as the ‘efficient causes’ of (i.e. the constraints determining) the
‘Immediate Objects’ of our experience, whether these be structures or processes, and more primordially,
appreciate the unprethinkable being from which Dynamical Processes, including ourselves, have emerged.
Dynamical Processes and the Semiosphere
What are the implications for this for Peirce’s theory of semiosis? Causation as characterized through this
more dynamic version of systems theory largely concurs with Peirce’s analysis. However, it adds several
dimensions. One is that it highlights the durational nature of causal processes, and in doing so highlights the
need for there to be hierarchies of organization characterized by different process rates. Salthe argued that
there must be at least three levels in these hierarchies to account for semiosis as Peirce described it: one
associated with the ‘objects’ to be interpreted, one associated with the observable signs of these objects, and
one associated with the interpretants, which he took to include the observing system (Salthe, 1985: chap.4,
esp. p.76; Salthe, 1993: 13ff.). Apart from these levels, there must also be individuals maintaining some
measure of identity through change, while maintaining unstable states such that the miniscule inputs from a
sign can contribute to realizing one of a range of possible interpretations, and in some cases, generate new
structures with new ranges of possibilities. The outcome of one interpretation could involve massive
physical changes as civilization and nature are set on one path rather than another. In essence, there must be
relative endurance through change able to effect or constrain further change.
This is clearly evident when we examine the science of global warming. The signs that were observable
included the ratios of oxygen isotopes in fossil forminifera shells. As noted above, the ratio of oxygen
isotopes signified the amount of water held in glaciers when the forminifera were alive, and these in turn
signified the temperature on Earth at that time. Forminifera living at different times then provided a record
of the Earth’s temperature over hundreds of thousands of years. To function as a record the life of individual
forminifera through which its shell was developed had to be relatively short compared to the history of
climate, but the shell had to endure. Stable structures such as the fixed geometrical relationships between
atoms in molecules which make up shells are maintained by a balance of forces which are the product of
such very fast rate processes relative to the processes of life. These structures can be treated as enduring
individual objects relative to both climate change and to their measurement. Such molecular structures are
central to the stability of all solids, including the rock formations left behind by glaciers and the mud on the
bottom of oceans. Interpretation of these structures involved a different scale again. After having been
obtained, observed and measured, processes of very short duration compared to the dynamics of the global
climate (although still long durational compared to the processes maintaining molecular structures), these
observations had to be remembered at least long enough for them to be written down in an enduring
structure that could be read later. Such observations by scientists presuppose long duration processes
associated with the reproduction and development of different scientific traditions, in turn dependent on
other cultural processes, including the reproduction and development of educational and research
institutions, national communities, and more broadly language communities of civilizations able to read
what has been written and pass on from generation to generation not only the capacity to read and
understand the significance of such observations, but the significance of educational institutions and science.
To fully appreciate the semiotics of global warming it is necessary to understand all these different levels of
activity and their relation to each other. Those arguing that humans can and are having a major affect on the
global climate are also showing how these diverse levels have some autonomy (i.e. they are not merely the
effect of elementary physical processes as the mechanists would have it). And yet they are more
inter-related than previously realized. It is for this reason that broader, more encompassing Dynamical
Processes are being recognized as what must be taken as the relevant Scientific Objects to be investigated if
we are to properly understand the situation we are in. Lovelock’s Gaia hypothesis has come to appear
increasingly plausible and relevant. The development of the global ecosystem or biosphere interacting with
the atmosphere, hydrosphere and geosphere, a Dynamical Process going back to the early years of the
Earth’s formation, has maintained the conditions for life and is the context within which various regimes,
ecosystems and life forms, including human civilizations, have developed. To comprehend what has been
involved in maintaining the conditions for life on Earth, Lovelock has offered a simple model of negative
feedback loops involving daisies with black, white and grey petals which could operate to help maintain a
stable temperature on Earth despite the increase in temperature of the Sun; but at the same time he has
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ascribed purpose to Gaia. For instance he offers a revised evolutionary theory according to which Gaia
evolves by removing those organisms that foul their own nest. How can the gap between these two ideas,
almost mechanical feedback loops and purpose, be bridged?
Hierarchy theory provides the key to this. It has been used to br idge the gap between two opposed families
of theories in ecology, the systems approach and population biology (O’Neill et.al., 1968). The systems
approach focused on ecosystems as wholes, examining how they utilize energy and circulate nutrients, but
ignoring organisms as such, while the population biologists focused on the interaction between organisms.
Both tended to be reductionist in different ways. Hierarchy theorists showed how the interaction between
organisms could generate constraints which would serve to maintain ecosystems and recycle nutrients over
durations longer than the lives of the individual organisms involved in this. Very often these constraints
involve conflict, as successful organisms that threaten the circulation of nutrients within an ecosystem by
increasing their numbers then attract predators or diseases which check their destructive influence. Such
constraining activity can be characterized as teleological in the sense that it has been defended by Salthe and
Juarrero as domination by emergent constraints leading to a final result (Salthe, 1993: 270; Juarro, 2002:
127f.). As Salthe put it: ‘constraints from the higher level not only help to select the lower level-trajectory
but also pull it into its future at the same time. Top-down causality is a form of final causality’ (1993: 270).
This can be seen as a final cause as the term was defended by Peirce, that is, a determination of the final
result without a determination of the particular way it will be brought about (EP II: 120). From Peirce’s
perspective, this is the Aristotelian form of teleology which does not yet involve purpose.
However, ecosystems are characterized by semiosis as bacteria, plants and animals interpret their 
environments and each other, and communicate with each other. Much of this semiosis is associated with 
organisms struggling for survival without any capacity to appreciate the ecological processes which are the 
conditions for their survival. However, symbiosis is also a major feature of ecosystems, central to their 
functioning, and semiosis is particularly important in symbiosis. The semiotic role of flowers in the 
symbiotic relation between plants and bees is just one example. Here organisms have come to appreciate the
significance of the continuing existence of at least some aspect of their environment for their survival. 
Organisms can be understood as tightly integrated ecosystems, and in such cases, the constraints are largely,
and perhaps mostly, semiotic. This is clearly the case in multicelled organisms. In the epigenesis of 
organisms and their functioning as adults, cell development and reproduction is constrained by emergent, 
developing fields generated by the interaction between cells (Trainor, 1989). In such cases individual cells 
interpret their environments and respond by the way they develop,  divide or refrain from dividing; in effect 
they constrain themselves for the common good, their growth being an interpretant of signs of the 
Dynamical Process of the whole organism of which they are part. 
Semiosis is also central to the immune system (Neuman, 2005). Generally, cells in an organism do not
destroy each other unless they are identified as foreign to the organism, as damaged, or as threatening in
some way the organism’s integrity. Damaged cells often self-destruct on instruction by the organism. More
complex multicelled organisms develop a number of different semiotic systems to maintain their health (i.e.
their wholeness). Only when these constraints break down do cells reproduce without constraint. This is
what happens with cancer. Cancer can be regarded as a subversion and corruption of normal semiosis so that
the body gets constrained and taken over by the cancerous tumour in a way which ultimately destroys the
whole body, including the tumour. While most ecosystems are not integrated to the same extent as
organisms, semiosis associated with symbiosis still plays a significant role in the self-maintianing dynamics
of the whole. It is in relation to this that we can, following Jesper Hoffmeyer, talk of the development of the
semiosphere (Hoffmeyer, 1996: 145), and it is in the context of this that Gaia can be seen to be beginning to
act purposefully.
Humanity, and the Semiosis of Gaia: Habitus and Fields
What part does humanity play in this semiosphere? Humans coevolved with other species in Africa, and
evolved as relatively insignificant components of African ecosystems. Their numbers were kept in check by
predators and diseases. However, when they invaded other ecosystems - Eurasia, Australia, the Americas
and New Zealand - they had devastating effects, leading in each case to vast numbers of extinctions. The
only real opposition to humans came from other humans. So while humans developed more complex forms
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of semiosis than had ever previously existed on Earth, and while this facilitated complex forms of
cooperation, initially this semiosis in no way served the ecosystems they invaded. Only later, it appears, did
humans come to appreciate their environments and through their unique semiosis develop constraints on
their interactions with their environments. Subsequent history has been characterized by further advances in
semiosis simultaneously augmenting humanity’s destructive potential, but also our capacity for
self-constraint. Destructiveness has been more common. The early civilizations tended to destroy their
environments. Only later, did civilizations such as China and India achieve some kind of balance with the
ecosystems of which they were part, and this balance has been broken with modernity. Originating in
Europe, modernity has been associated with the conquest and subjugation of most of the world by
Europeans, the disembedding of markets from communities (so that communities are subjected to the laws
of the market rather than markets being institutions serving the community), industrialization on the basis of
fossil fuels and massive environmental destruction, exacerbated by violent or potentially violent competition
between increasingly powerful states capable of sustained mass mobilization of resources to dominate the
world for access to and control of resources. While the ‘war communism’ of fascism, Naziism and Stalinism
followed by the Cold War fuelled state mobilized economic expansion for much of the twentieth century, a
new impetus to this destructive trajectory has emerged with the development of transnational corporations
promoting the ideology of neo-liberalism. Under the slogan ‘privatise, deregulate, and do not interfere with
the market’ (Frank, 2001: 5), neo-liberals have severely curtailed what freedom communities had achieved
after the Great Depression to control their markets and achieve the liberty to choose their future. If anything,
the destructive impact of humanity on the global ecosystem is intensifying as the ideology of modernization
and unconstrained markets have penetrated every corner of the world.
Despite this, the capacity for self-constraint also appears to be growing. This self-constraint is connected to 
the development of the capacity to respect others as other free agents rather than things or objects, and for 
people to limit their actions on the basis of this assumption (Gare, 2000), organizing the world as a hierarchy
of communities of communities. In this way the human semiosphere (as this term was developed by Iurii 
Lotman (1990: 123ff.)) has augmented the global semiosphere so that, as Lovelock argued, Gaia has become
self-conscious (Lovelock, 1979: 147). The global ecosystem has developed a stronger form of telos 
associated with semiosis, a telos involving a symbol (of the state of health of Gaia) which then influences, or
could influence action, in the way Peirce characterized such influence. On this basis it is entirely justified to 
refer to Gaia as acting, or having the potential to act, purposefully.
It is in the effort to comprehend these two opposing trajectories that it becomes clear that Peircian semiotics 
in its original form was deficient, and that the root of its deficiency was in its failure to identify and 
characterize the primary existents as self-maintaining Dynamical Processes, and so to provide a place for 
considering semiosis in relation to self-maintaining patterns of activity of which it is a part. In the case of 
human communities, organizations or institutions the semiosis is extremely complex because it 
simultaneously involves interpretation of the natural environment and of the products of human activity, of 
the relations between people and of a variety of social forms generated by and then constraining these 
relations, of the relationship between these different forms, which sometimes support each other and 
sometimes are at odds with each other, the relationships between different communities or societies, and the 
situation of individuals engaged in this complex world, all of which are to some extent constituted by such 
semiosis. That is, the Dynamical Processes which are the objects interpreted are complex and involve 
inevitable conflicts of interest, yet to a considerable extent are the products of interpretation, so that any 
efforts to advance interpretation inevitably involves intervening in ideological debates and struggles 
impacting on different interests.
The most adequate conceptualization of this complexity in a form which can be integrated with Peircian
semiotics has been provided by Pierre Bourdieu. Upholding the primacy of practical reason over reflective
thought (under the influence of Marx and Heidegger, both of whom had been influenced by Schelling), and
responding to the work of the structuralists, Bourdieu developed a way of characterizing practical action
which could account for the observations of the structuralists while avoiding their failures. His core concepts
were the ‘habitus’ and the ‘field’, each of which is seen to be the product of the other. The habitus, 
Bourdieu defined as:
… systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function
as structuring structures, that is, as principles which generate and organize practices and
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representations that can be objectively adapted to their outcomes without presupposing a
conscious aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary in order to obtain
them. Objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without being in any way the product of obedience
to rules, they can be collectively orchestrated without being the product of the organizing action
of a conductor (Bourdieu, 1990: 53).
He defined a field as:
… a network, or configuration, of objective relations between positions. These positions are
objectively defined, in their existence and in the determinations they impose upon their
occupants, agents or institutions, by their present and potential  situation (situs) in the structure 
and distribution of species of power (or capital) whose possession commands access to the 
specific profits that are at stake in the field, as well as by their objective relation to other 
positions (domination, subordination, homology, etc.) (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992: 97). 
Clearly, the notion of habitus 
has something in common with Peirce’s notion of habits, including ‘belief-habits’ (EP I: 201f.), but several
dimensions are added by Bourdieu. To begin with, Bourdieu had identified a form of embodied belief which
is neither fully conscious nor unconscious, and had seen that part of this belief is in the reality of the socially
constituted fields within which people are acting and striving for ‘capital’ or power. It is acting on this basis
that the field is continually reproduced and developed. While fields are reproduced by the habitus of people, 
at the same time the field engenders this habitus in its participants.
This characterization of individuals in fields concurs with Peirce’s characterization of individuals as knots in
a semiotic net, but provides a better basis for understanding their motivations and the dynamics of
communities of which they are part. As noted, individuals participating in the fields are seen by Bourdieu as
striving for the ‘capital’ which will enable them to continue pursuing capital within the field, but they do so
in a way that constrains them to uphold and augment the field, and to exclude people who undermine the
autonomy of the field. There are various forms of capital, but the most important is ‘symbolic capital’,
essentially prestige or recognition from other members of the field, the kind of recognition that enables them
to define and impose their definition of reality. That is, the development of fields is an aspect of the struggle
for recognition identified by Fichte and further elaborated by Schelling and Hegel. It is this socially
engendered struggle which largely accounts of the dynamics and functioning of fields. The struggle for
recognition can account for the emergence of fields in the first place, and then their development. A
developing field is a Dynamical Process which maintains and augments its existence. However, individuals
are not simply determined by the field, and respond creatively to opportunities as these arise, often changing
the field in the process. They also participate in different fields, and change the fields to which they give
their primary allegiance. With these notions Bourdieu established a research programme that has enabled us
to examine the birth of fields, how they operate to exclude certain people and include others, how they
modify the attitudes of their participants and are modified by their participants, and the relationship between
fields. The relationship between fields can be very complex as they can form nested hierarchies (as for
instance when the field of poetry operates within the field of literature, which operates in the broader
cultural field) but which can also be such as to cut across different hierarchies (as when a local field of
science is situated within the fields of a national culture but is also within the international field of science).
Re-Examing the Paradoxical State of Modern Civilization
At the beginning of this paper I suggested that there is a paradox in that while humans have identified the
causes of and have come to understand the disastrous effects of global warming, collectively they are not
responding appropriately. Is this a paradox for Peirce? He wrote in ‘Philosophy and the Conduct of Life’
that ‘pure theoretical knowledge, or science, has nothing directly to say concerning practical matters, and
nothing even applicable at all to vital crises. Theory is applicable to minor practical affairs; but matters of
vital importance must be left to sentiment, that is, to instinct’ (EP II: 33). In the same paper he argued that
‘Reason is of its very essence egoistical. … Men many times fancy that they act from reason when, in point
of fact, the reasons they attribute to themselves are nothing but excuses which unconscious instinct invents
to satisfy the reasoning “why’s” of the ego’
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(EP II: 32). From this perspective, where Peirce appears to align himself most closely with Darwinian 
thinking, the failure to respond to the threat of global warming is what we would expect. People will 
continue to act egoistically, occasionally rationalizing their egoism, and the findings of science will have 
very little impact on the way they behave. On this view, we can expect a shakeout of humanity and other 
species in which the fittest (presumably the people who have accumulated most wealth to allow them to 
purchase their way into the future polar civilization, along with the survivors among those they employ to 
keep the others out and the plants and animals they choose to preserve) will survive, thereby furthering 
evolutionary progress. 
But Peirce was vehemently opposed to Darwinism which ‘merely extends politico-economical views of
progress to the entire realm of animal and vegetable life’, accounting for ‘those exquisite and marvelous
adaptations of nature’ as nothing but the outcome of ‘the struggle for existence’ between creatures, whereby
‘those of them that happen to have the slightest advantage force those less pushing into situations
unfavourable to multiplication or even kill them before they reach the age of reproduction’ (EP II: 357). His
defence of the disinterested pursuit of knowledge in science and philosophy and his own devotion to this
were in direct opposition to the utilitarianism and instrumental thinking of the Social Darwinists. Peirce was
defending a more subtle position, defending disinterested pursuit of knowledge as the condition for
overcoming Social Darwinism; that is, defending the autonomy of the scientific field as the condition for
questioning prevailing assumptions about life. Elsewhere he argued that ‘the ideas “justice” and “truth” are,
notwithstanding the iniquity of the world, the mightiest of the forces that move it’ (EP II: 343). Peirce then
defended an alternative evolutionary theory. In his essay ‘Evolut ionary Love’, Peirce argued that Darwinian
evolutionary theory is deficient and proposed a more complex account of evolution which gave a place to
‘evolution by fortuitous variation, evolution by mechanical necessity, and evolution by creative love’, which
he labeled, respectively, tychasm, anacasm, and agapasm (EP I: 362). That is, Peirce followed Darwin in
granting a place to chance variations and selection, but also gave a place to ordered development (associated
with epigenesis) and more importantly to emergence generated by psychical endeavour, usually
unconscious, fixed by habit which both establishes the new features generated by spontaneous energy, and
harmonizes them (EP I: 360). This is ‘the formula of an evolutionary philosophy, which teaches that growth
comes … from love, from … the ardent impulse to fulfil another’s highest impulse …. from every individual
merging his individuality in sympathy with his neighbors’ (EP II: 354).
What is left out of this account of evolution is any systematic effort to relate evolution to the emergence of
new Dynamical Processes, although this is touched on in the essay ‘Man’s Glassy Essence’ where he
suggests that corporations might develop minds as incomprehensible to us as we are to our brain cells (EP I:
350), and in his Cambridge Conference Lectures in which he notes that arts, like organisms, manifest their
‘internal destiny’ to ‘grow into pure sciences’ (Peirce, 1992: 119). Once such emergence is given a proper
place, then there is a paradox, and it can be explained. Effectively, I have been examining this whole
situation on the assumption that Peirce’s Schellingian optimism is basically correct, but that his development
of this tradition is too limited to work out where things are going wrong. With the notion of the cosmos as
consisting of emergent self-organising processes and structures which only exist by asserting themselves
against the tendencies of their environments, and rethinking the place of semiosis accordingly, it should now
be possible to clarify this paradox.
To begin with, it is necessary to understand the achievement of modern science in developing a world-view
through which we can now understand some of the dynamics of the global bio-atmo-hydro-geosphere, or
Gaia, which engendered us and of which we are part, and to allow us to appreciate how we could be
undermining the favourable regime that has emerged within it over the last 10,000 years. The development
of science has been associated with the emergence of a global scientific field committed to truth and to
providing objective knowledge, despite being dependent upon insti tutions and organizations of nation-states
and the economy which are often in conflict with each other. The scientific field, the philosophical field
from which it arose, and the broader cultural fields of which they are part, and the economic and political
institutions which support them, are themselves genuine emergents within civilization, within humanity and
within nature. To some extent the development of these institutions and fields has been associated with the
quest to extend control over nature and to dominate people; however at least as important for understanding
the driving force for their emergence and development has been the struggle for recognition, which requires
reciprocity to succeed. Bourdieu’s analyses of fields show how this struggle for recognition operates in
concrete contexts. He showed how the autonomization of these fields engenders the quest for higher ideals,
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such as truth, particularly in the case of science (Bourdieu, 1975). It is this struggle for recognition in the
context of fields that can account for history developing largely as Schelling conjectured it would towards
the creation of ‘a federation of all states, who mutually guarantee their respective regimes’ (Schelling,
1800/1978: 198). While Schelling held the diffusion of a true legal system as a condition for the
development of a universal constitution, he also pointed out there must also be a history of tradition and
transmission whereby this ideal can be passed on from generation to generation (200). Clearly, people must
also be inspired by this ideal for it to be effective, and it is in this context that the development of art,
philosophy, literature and science are of central importance. The realization of this ideal could easily include
grappling with the global ecological crisis and embodying in institutions proper recognition of the rest of
nature.
However, conceived in this way, it should be evident that it is unlikely that such a development would be 
achieved smoothly since the ideal is dependent upon conflicting lower level Dynamical Processes, many of 
which have no sense at all of the broader Dynamical Processes which provide the conditions of their 
existence, to uphold and sustain it. In the nineteenth century this conflict was associated with colonialism 
and imperialist rivalries and in the twentieth century with the world wars and neo-colonialism. But such 
conflict has often been the driving force for the development of the ideal. The League of Nations emerged 
from World War I and the United Nations from World War II. The development of science underlying the 
discovery of global warming gained a major boost from the World War II and the Cold War. Science itself 
involves the transformation of exergy (negative entropy) into entropy and has been made possible through, 
and has been supported as a means to more effective domination of nature and people and achieving greater 
access to exergy, the driving forces for increasing greenhouse gas emissions. Because of the underlying 
conflict and rivalries, not to mention the greed and slothfulness of the beneficiaries of success in such 
struggles, it was inevitable that there would be strong resistance to efforts to impose constraints on any 
actors within any field, individual or collective, each of which in its struggles will be striving to impose its 
own definition of reality to serve its own struggle for power. What we have seen, as Schelling predicted, 
was a slow process by which humanity evolved into a global community of communities as through conflict 
people came to appreciate as part of their habitus that each field within which they were participating was 
part of and could only be sustained by a whole hierarchy of differentiated cultural, social, political and 
economic fields. The extension of this appreciation beyond the global community of humanity to the 
community of the global eco-system and to Gaia, to some extent foreshadowed by some religions, can be 
seen as a further unfolding of this logic. But there could be no guarantee of success.
The Globalization of the Market as Cancer
To acknowledge conflict underlying this evolution does not, however, completely explain the extent of the
failure to respond to the impending crisis. To understand this it is necessary to look at the new drive to
disembed markets from communities associated with the rise of transnational corporations promoting
unconstrained markets and consumerism in place of democracy, aligned with authoritarian governments and
backed by a new form of neo-imperialism which imposes market relations on resource rich countries by
force in the name of ‘democracy’. Transcending nation states, transnational corporations have used their
power to create a global state which, subverting the project associated with the establishment of the United
Nations and the Bretton Woods system of creating an international order of self-determining nations, in
alignment with authoritarian governments such as that of China, is transforming the institutions of
nation-states into its instruments serving the expansion of the market and corporate growth (Robinson, 2004:
chap.3). In so doing they have undermined to varying degrees the partial autonomy of the diverse fields,
including nation-states, which had articulated this community of communities, dissolving social life into the
global market. It is this expansion that must inevitably accelerate environmental destruction. Barbara
Harriss-White in a detailed study has shown how in Britain, where public institutions have been almost
totally subverted by neo-liberal policies (Monbiot, 2001: chap.1), every initiative to develop alternative,
renewable forms of energy was stymied (Harriss-White, 2006).
How can this be understood? David Korten, author of When Corporations Rule the World, offers a plausible 
diagnosis. He suggested that the growth of unregulated markets is a cancer:
Cancer occurs when genetic damage causes a cell to forget that it is part of a large body, the
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healthy function of which is essential to its own survival. The cell begins to seek its own growth
without regard to the consequences for the whole, and ultimately destroys the body that feeds it.
As I learned more about the course of cancer’s development within the body, I came to realize
that the reference to capitalism as a cancer is less a metaphor than a clinical diagnosis of a
pathology to which market economies are prone in the absence of adequate citizen and
government oversight (Korten, 2000: 15).
This metaphor of cancer can be extended by interpreting it semiotically. The damaged cells not only forget 
their position in the whole and proliferate uncontrollably, they corrupt the semiosis within the body and 
through their rhetoric reorganize the body to feed the growing tumours. If no vital organ is affected, the 
body eventually dies of starvation.
A feature of transnational corporations is that through massive spending on public relations and advertising, 
they are corrupting healthy forms of semiosis. The campaign of disinformation on climate change by 
ExxonMobil and other corporations is only the very tip of the iceberg. As Alex Carey demonstrated in his 
study of public relations in Taking the Risk out of Democracy: Corporate Propaganda versus Freedom and 
Liberty, 
not only have corporations sought to control what politicians and the general public think, they have sought
in countries throughout the world to penetrate schools and influence the curricula and co-opt the social
sciences to serve their purposes (Carey, 1997: chap.9). In USA they have largely succeeded in gaining
control over language, changing the meaning of core concepts such as freedom, liberty and democracy,
thereby controlling the framing of every important political debate and making the defence of real
democracy extremely difficult (Lakoff, 2004; Lakoff, 2006). Advertising complements public relations.
Most artwork in the world at present is devoted to or has been appropriated by the advertising industry
(Haug, 1986: 122ff.). Advertising, spending on which increased in USA from $50 billion to $200 billion
between 1979 and 1998 (Kline, 199: 11), no longer confines itself to promoting particular products. It
promotes a whole way of life symbolized by corporate logos. So, as Naomi Klein noted in her study of the
effects of the ‘glow’ of corporate logos (‘loglo’), ‘in the late seventies, as the loglo grew brighter,
social-justice activism faded; its woefully unmarketable ways no longer held much appeal for energetic
young people or for media obsessed with slick aesthetics’ (Klein, 1999: 349). Advertising has increased its
effectiveness by targeting children. The impact of art outside advertising has been neutralized by
reconceiving it as part of the entertainment industry.
It was not just social-justice activism that was weakened, however; the habitus of actors within all cultural
and political fields sustaining principles and values beyond economic gain has been weakened. The quest
for truth, let alone justice, is now experienced as ‘not worth the candle’ by young people. The effect of this
is evident in the higher proportion of students enrolling in the business faculties of universities and the
decline of both the sciences and the humanities. The natural sciences are being transformed into
techno-sciences only valued for their contribution to profit making, their commitment to truth weakened as
scientists and universities have been forced to depend for funding upon targeted government and corporate
grants (Dickson, 2000). The effect on the human sciences and the humanities is even more dramatic. The
humanities have been almost completely marginalized, and in Anglophone countries sociology and political
science have been fragmented to serve particular economic roles. At the same time the influence of
economics has increased dramatically.
The rise of economics is not the triumph of science, however. It has been associated with the revival of
neo-classical economics, despite the devastating critiques of the fundamental assumptions of this school of
thought by institutionalist, political, ecological and mathematical economists, not to mention philosophers
(Daly and Cobb, 1994; Mirowski, 1991; Mirowski, 2002; Arthur, 1994; Keen, 2001). This revival is
essentially the revival of what Peirce characterized as the ‘the conviction of the nineteenth century … that
progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s striving for himself with all his might and trampling his
neighbor under foot whenever he gets a chance to do so.’ That is,  it is revival of what ‘may accurately be
called the Gospel of Greed’ (EP II: 357). While some economists have struggled to advance economics as a
science committed to the truth, such work is largely ignored by mainstream economists whose research
funding and consultancy fees depend on providing governments and corporations with the advice they want
to hear. The field of economics has lost its autonomy, with the quest for truth being subordinated to the
quest for political influence and economic reward, which the discipline itself now legitimates. Economics is
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no longer focused on the public good, and Nobel Prizes are awarded to economists who discover new ways
of making profits from stock markets. Economists serve the public relations arms of transnational
corporations and the emerging global state to legitimate the elimination of trade barriers, the privatization of
public assets and the extension of the market to all facets of life. The language of neo-classical economics
has been deployed to redefine liberty as the operation of free markets, to defend calculating egoism as a
virtue and to foster a belief in endless economic growth (Amadae, 2003: chap.7). The public relations
industry has used neo-classical economics to put the market in the place of God as the ultimate Being before
which everyone must be judged, and effectively transformed economics from a science into a theology.
By successfully deploying the language of neo-classical economics, promoting the ‘user pays’ principle and
calling for ‘accountability’, the public relations industry has made it all but impossible to defend the
autonomy of cultural, social and political fields. Education is being reconceived as nothing but a business
selling the means to make more money and the Humboldtian model of the university is being replaced by
the transnational business enterprise model ( Readings, 1996), thereby undermining discourses contesting
the validity claims of the public relations industry and neo-classical economics. Having achieved
overwhelming symbolic power, neo-classical economists have used the language of economics to redefine
and thereby mystify the relationship between citizens and politicians (with elections reconceived as
markets), workers and employers, producers and consumers, primary producers and industry, and most
importantly, between countries extracting raw materials and agricultural products for export and countries
involved in high technology production (Hornborg, 2001: 14ff.). And underlying all these developments are
the subtle forms of semiotic corruption associated with the commodification of every facet of life and the
mediation of almost all human relationship by machine technology (Hornborg, 2001: chap.7 & 8).
The members of the new, corporation based transnational ruling class are aware that their assumptions jar
with environmental limits. This is evident in their identification of environmentalists as the greatest threat to
their ideal of unlimited corporate growth with a pacified population of consumers. Leslie Sklair has
described their proactive response to this: the development of corporate environmentalism promoting
‘sustainable development’ in order to take the initiative and define the agenda of environmentalism,
deflecting anything threatening their power and profits (Sklair, 2001: chap.7). Recently, carbon trading
permits have been promoted as a market solution to the problem of global warming, a ‘solution’ which in
practice has proved totally ineffective and blocked more adequate responses based on taxation and rationing.
The failure of these ‘solutions’ does not mean that members of this class are not seriously concerned by
ecological destruction; it simply means that their commitment to the global market in which they are the
winners is stronger than their commitment to the future of humanity.
Restoring Healthy Semiosis: Maintaining the Autonomy of Fields
In The Discovery of Global Warming 
Weart concluded by noting the appalling record of corporations and called for efforts ‘to improve the
communication of knowledge and to strengthen democratic control in governance everywhere’ (201).
Environmentalists have become increasingly aware that the promotion of strong democracy is crucial to
achieving a proper response to environmental destruction. This is not only so because of the destructive
imperatives of corporations which in many countries, including USA, are legally obliged to maximize
returns to shareholders, which means that subordinating this goal for the common good is illegal. And where
corporations do put ‘stakeholders’ ahead of ‘shareholders’, as in some European countries, they are
dependent on state support the power of which is being undermined by the global market (Gray, 2002:
chap.4). But more is involved. It is also because so long as people see their primary role as consumers their
goal will be to get as many consumer goods as possible for the least cost, while when they define their
primary role as governors, they are obliged to and can be expected to at least think about what is required
for the common good of their community (Prugh et.al., 2000: 99). This is even more likely if underlying this
people see themselves as creating themselves and their community through their thoughts and actions. The
difference democracy makes is evident in the divergent trajectories of Sweden, which still has a strong
democracy, and Australia, in which democracy has been almost completely undermined through the
neo-liberal policies of its governments. Sweden produces a third of the greenhouse gas emissions per person
as does Australia, and is at the forefront of agitation for further reductions, while the Australian government
has resisted every effort to curtail its emissions. The problem is how to revive democracy and regain
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democratic control over institutions and the economy. Democracy requires healthy semiosis, and this has
been severely corrupted. How can this semiotic corruption be overcome?
To begin with, we should note that semiosis has not been entirely corrupted as is evident from the
development of climate science and the dissemination of their ideas, resulting in some pressure from the
general public to act effectively. Bourdieu’s notion of fields and how they develop provides some insight
into this. Individuals insofar as they are seen as belonging to and expressing the viewpoint of this highly
exclusive field which in the past has demonstrated its commitment to and success in upholding the quest for
truth have more symbolic power in society generally, including global society, than can be bought by the
most powerful corporations. This is why rhetoric cannot be understood at the level of individual signs.
Scientists to influence people must above all maintain the autonomy, integrity and standing of the scientific
field and their own standing within this. Healthy semiosis requires is conditional upon maintaining the
autonomy of diverse cultural and political fields from the economic field, particularly the global economic
field.
Responding to the ecological crisis will to a large extent depend upon success in reversing current trends
and augmenting the autonomy of cultural, social and political fields from the economic field, and in
particular, from the field of the global economy, and central to this is controlling semiotic corruption and
cleaning up semiotic pollution. For instance the power of transnational corporations and media moguls to
corrupt and pollute healthy semiosis could be partly checked by heavily taxing or restricting expenditure on
advertising and public relations. Of course for a market economy to work successfully people must be
informed about products. But markets would function more efficiently if people based their decisions on
accurate knowledge rather than rhetoric aiming to undermine their capacity to think rationally. Accurate
information would be far better disseminated through channels monitored by a professional civil service
committed to the public good. In cases of disputes about claims, rather than advertising or public relations
exercises, what is required are courts where producers could present their case that their products are better
value than rivals, and have their case judged impartially – by a publicly funded legal system supported by
increased taxes on business made possible by the savings they would make on advertising. Public relations
also should be considered a matter of establishing the truth, with the role of public relations experts being
redefined as the equivalent of advocates in courts of law, employed to ensure that justice prevails. Efforts by
corporations to use public relations to deliberately undermine healthy semiosis and to subvert justice should
be made illegal, including funding of and lobbying of political parties. Such changes would have the added
advantage that they would undermine the bloated profits of the media moguls and public relations firms and
return news media to its original role of disseminating news.
The obverse of combating semiotic corruption involves promoting healthy semiosis. In this regard it is 
necessary to rethink the role of science, the humanities, the arts and particularly education in society. 
Democracy means the people themselves are the governors of society, so they must be educated and 
properly informed to be governors, with not only the technical knowledge but the character and wisdom for 
this. A democratic culture requires the autonomy of science, educational and media institutions to cultivate 
such knowledge, character and wisdom. Autonomy by itself is not enough, however. Largely autonomous 
universities have fragmented knowledge over 4000 areas of specialization and denigrated the work of those 
attempting to overcome this fragmentation, either from within universities or from without. The habitus of 
scientists and academics, to the extent that it does involve a concern with more than getting paid for work, 
seldom extends much beyond a commitment to their micro-areas of specialization, and many academics 
have deliberately worked to undermine the autonomy of the academic field (Bourdieu, 1993: 41). It is this 
fragmentation and disloyalty which has weakened them, greatly facilitating efforts to reduce them to 
business corporations. The problem is how to overcome academic fragmentation and restore science and 
educational institutions to health.
Healthy Semiosis and ‘Indwelling’
To do this it is necessary to defend something more than the quest for objective knowledge. Peirce argued
that all interpretants involve feeling as a sense of comprehending the meaning of a sign. Beyond this,
interpretants may involve effort, and some may also include thought. He characterized these respectively as
‘emotional’, ‘energetic’ and ‘logical’ interpretants (EP II: 409). While logical interpretants emerge on a
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foundation of feeling and effort, once in the realm of thought, feeling and effort can become attenuated. It is
in this state that inquiry can become academic game playing and knowledge can become fragmented. How
can this emotional force and coherence of knowledge be regained? And how can a habitus be cultivated
which involves appreciating at the level of bodily dispositions all the fields which sustain science, culture,
civilization, humanity and life? It is here that ‘indwelling’ should play a role. If it were recognized that
interpretation of Dynamical Processes requires indwelling through the use of metaphors and metonyms, and
indwelling (or ‘understanding’) were made central to both science and education, this could re-engage
abstract thought with feeling and action and strengthen the habitus of people working in fields sustaining a 
concern for truth, justice and the long term future of life. 
The goal of science and education, focused on achieving understanding, would be to facilitate deeper 
indwelling in the universe as whole and in its emergent Dynamical Processes: in Gaia, in the regime of Gaia 
which has engendered and sustained human civilization, and with all the complex processes, including the 
processes of ecosystems and human formations and fields, including the particular local fields within which 
each individual is participating. This would enable each individual to achieve a sense of their place and role 
in this cosmos. Indwelling would involve appreciating how Dynamical Processes are related to each other, 
including how they are supporting or undermining each other. By enabling people to indwell and thereby 
experience themselves as part of the unfolding drama of nature and civilization, to experience within 
themselves how the present regime of Gaia is in danger of succumbing to what is really a form of cancer, an 
impetus could be provided to uphold the autonomy and integrity of diverse fields and reverse the growing 
fragmentation of knowledge. It appears to be this felt concern for the future of life which accounts for the 
impressive achievements of climate scientists overcoming disciplinary and national boundaries and 
integrating work from diverse sources from around the world and to begin to understand the world as a 
complex of Dynamical Processes. 
As it has for climate scientists, the impetus provided by such felt concern for the future of life should
accelerate the transcendence of one of the root causes of intellectual fragmentation, the mechanical
world-view. This legitimates endless analysis as the best means to accumulate knowledge, and justifies
treating knowledge as merely an instrument to control the world. The rejection of this world-view is
associated with the advance of transdisciplines such as tektology, systems theory, hierarchy theory,
complexity theory and semiotics which enable different disciplines to be related to each other. Such
transdisciplines should lead to an appreciation of the importance to science of speculative metaphysics, and
the root metaphors they articulate. In the case of semiotics, its development should lead to more attention
being paid to Peirce’s defence of metaphysics and his suggestion that ‘the Universe as an argument is
necessarily a great work of art, a great poem, - for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony’ (EP II:
194). Speculative metaphysics not only reveals the real choices of research programmes open to science but
also the social and political implications of these. Although it is seldom recognized as such, it is the
Schellingian tradition which is opening up new perspectives in one area of science after another,
invalidating the mechanical world-view on which neo-classical economics, reductionist psychology and
Social Darwinism are based and providing intellectual support for the struggle for democracy.
This Schellingian tradition is both changing science and the relation of science to the rest of culture and to 
nature. As Hornborg, whose work can be interpreted as advancing of the Schellingian tradition, noted:
The Western mode of understanding reality is well summed up in the word “analysis” – the
breaking up of something into its constituent elements. … One such distinction that has been
challenged in recent years is between science, ideology, and culture. We still often implicitly 
distinguish between three such forms of cognition, as if science was truth, ideology was lies, 
and culture some kind of quaint, exotic misunderstanding. It has become increasingly evident, 
however, that they all belong to the same supercategory. They are  modes of representation, 
modes of producing meaningful images of the world (Hornborg, 2001: 129).
The Schellingian tradition rejects the sharp bifurcation between the natural and the human sciences and the
sciences, the humanities and the arts. The ‘new alliance’ between science and the humanities celebrated by
Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers (1984: 11, 311) is really the triumph of the Schellingian tradition.
Seeing humans as social, free agents within and part of nature requires that not only existing schools of
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thought but their assumed disciplinary boundaries should be rejected. In place of neo-classical economics,
sociology, anthropology, social psychology and political science,  it is necessary to recognize the
pre-eminence of human ecology, ecological economics (incorporating institutionalist economics) and
culturology (incorporating sociology), and the importance of trasnsdisciplines, including history, tektology,
systems theory, complexity theory, semiotics and speculative metaphysics, for interpreting the dynamics of
humans in both their relation to each other and to the rest of nature, and as the basis for orienting people for
action and forming public policy. Acceptance of this Schellingian tradition also involves rejecting the
marginalization of the arts. These should no longer be seen as merely amusements, decorations and
investments, but as complimentary to science and philosophy. Music, art, poetry and other literature,
cartoons, films and television drama, in so far as they are concerned with truth, should not only facilitate
deeper indwelling in the world, but help to reveal its value and inspire people to act accordingly. In this
regard, we might heed Peirce’s proclamation that ‘nothing is truer than true poetry. And let me tell the
scientific men that the artists are much finer and more accurate observers than they are, except of the special
minutiae that the scientific man is looking for’ (EP II: 193). By cultivating deeper indwelling within the
Dynamical Processes of which they are part, through incorporating a commitment to these as part of their
habitus, the actions and lives as well as the ideas of people should themselves become inspiring interpretants
of Gaia and the life that is being sustained by its current regime.
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